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The paper examines the determination of bank lending during the Finnish credit 
boom of 1986-1990 with the data of  483 savings and cooperative banks. A particular 
objective is to establish whether bank behaviour is consistent with what is called 
moral hazard hypothesis, according to which banks expanded risky lending in part 
to benefit from  underpricing of bank liabilities  and/or anticipated bank support 
policies, which would reward capital insufficiency. The results strongly support the 
moral  hazard  hypothesis.  Growth  of lending  was,  ceteris  paribus,  negatively 
associated with bank capital and positively associated with bank costs. Also the 
behaviour of subordinated debt is consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. The 
findings  suggest that the  cause of such behaviour was  underpriced non-deposit 
liabilities rather than underpriced deposit insurance or anticipation at perverse bank 
policies. The perverse behaviour was much stronger among the savings banks than 
among the cooperative banks. According to calculations based on the estimation 
results, the growth rate of savings bank lending had been 1/3 smaller than the actual 
growth  rate  in  1986-1990 in  the  absence  of moral hazard.  In the  case  of the 
cooperative banks the estimated moral hazard effect is less than 1110 of the growth 
rate. Given the clear positive association of the rate of growth of lending during the 
boom period and the amount of non-performing assets later during the banking crisis, 
the disproportionary losses of the savings bank group  are  - in the light of this 
analysis - largely due to moral hazard. Consequently also most of the government 
expenditure on bank support appears to be caused by distorted incentives. 
Keywords: bank lending, moral hazard, deposit insurance, creditor protection, bank 
support 
3 Tiivistelma 
Paperissa tutkitaan pankkien luotonannon maaraytymista Suomen luottobuumin vuo-
sina 1986-1990 saasto-ja osuuspankkien 483 havainnosta koostuvalla aineistolla. 
Erityisesti pyritaan selvittamaan, onko pankkien kayttaytyrninen sopusoinnussa ns. 
moral hazard -hypoteesin kanssa, jonka mukaan pankit laajensivat riskipitoista luo-
tonantoaan osaksi hyotyakseen velkojensa alihinnoittelusta jaltai odottaessaan huo-
nosti harkitun pankkitukipolitiikan palkitsevan paaomavaatimuksen alittamisen. Tu-
lokset tukevat voimakkaasti moral hazard hypoteesia. Luotonannon kasvun ja  pankin 
oman paaoman vaIilla oli negatiivinen ja  luotonannon kasvun ja  pankin kustannusten 
vaIilla positiivinen riippuvuus. Myos vastuudebetuureja koskevat havainnot tukevat 
moral hazard -hypoteesia. Eraat seikat viittaavat siihen, etta kyse oli pikemminkin ra-
hamarkkinoilta hankitun rahoituksen alihinnoittelusta kuin alihinnoittellusta talletus-
suojasta tai pankkitukea koskevista odotuksista. Vaaransuuntainen kayttaytyminen 
oli paljon voimakkaampaa saastOpankeilla kuin osuuspankeilla. Estimointituloksiin 
perustuvien laskelmien mukaan saastopankkien luotonannon kasvu olisi jaanyt 113 
toteutunutta pienemmaksi ilman moral hazardia. Osuuspankkien kohdalla vastaava 
arvioitu vaikutus oli alle 10 prosenttia luotonannon kasvusta. Kun ottaa huomioon 
selvan positiivisen yhteyden buumivuosien luotonannon kasvun ja kriisivuosien jar-
jestamattomien luottojen vaIilla, saastOpankkien suhteettoman suuret tappiot ovat -
taman analyysin valossa - paaosin moral hazardin aiheuttamia. Siten myos paaosa 
julkisista pankkitukimenoista nayttaisi aiheutuneen vaaristyneista kannustimista. 
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5 1  Introduction 
Bank lending grew very rapidly in Finland in the aftermath of  financial liberalization 
in the late 1980s; the loans oustanding of the deposit banks alone more than doupled 
from FIM 190 billion at the end of 1986 to FIM 388 billion in the four years time by 
the end of 1990. During the subsequent depression, the newly extended credit turned 
out highly risky.  A large fraction on bank lending - cumulatively over FIM 100 
billion turned non-performing by 1995, and the deposit banks booked credit and 
guarantee losses for over FIM 70 billion over the period 1991 through 1995. 
Although many factors contributed to the general economic boom of the late 
1980s  and  the  subsequent depression,  there  are  reasons  to  believe  that  highly 
aggressive lending policies by at least a part of the banking system were an important 
element - and potentially even a cause of the overheating, see Vihriiila (1996a). At 
any rate, there is a clear negative bank level relationship between the rate of growth 
of  lending in the 1980s and the subsequent asset quality (Solttila and Vihriiila 1994). 
Literature contains several stories, which explain why banks' lending policies 
might vary and in particular result in "excessive" risky lending. Vihrihla (1996b) 
elaborates perhaps the most prominent such explanation, moral hazard caused by 
underpriced bank refinancing and/or inadequate capital regulation. At least since 
Merton (1977) underpriced funding combined with weak capital has been regarded 
as a potentially important reason for banks to take "excessive" risks. Most accounts 
of the thrift institution crisis of the 1980s in the United States name moral hazard 
associated with the flat-rate deposit insurance system as a central cause of the highly 
risky portfolios chosen by many of the savings and loan institutions that eventually 
failed. Also in the context of the Nordic banking crises of the 1990s, moral hazard 
associated with the public safety net has been named as one of the main culprits (eg. 
Koskenkyla and Vesala 1994). 
Despite the strong theoretical case, empirical evidence about the role of moral 
hazard is rather ambiguous.  While ego Keeley (1990) finds evidence of moral hazard 
leading excessive risk taking by American banks in the 1980s, several studies fail to 
detect such effects.1 No studies on European data seem to exist. 
The recent Finnish banking history is a very interesting test case of the moral 
hazard hypothesis. First, as in the neighbouring Sweden and Norway, the banking 
crisis in Finland is a first-order event in that the risks the banks took in the late 1980s 
led a significant part of the banking system to loose all of its capital during the 
depression of 1991  through 1993. Second, given the large number of individual 
banking institutions with widely varying capital positions, costs and observed lending 
behaviour but essentially the same regulatory environment, reliable statistical analysis 
should be possible to discriminate between various hypotheses. Thus if the moral 
hazard hypothesis is of practical importance rather than just a theoretical footnote, it 
should show up in the data.  Finally, given the importance of banks in  financial 
intermediation in Finland, any factor that helps to explain the behaviour of banks also 
contributes to understanding of the emergence and evolution of perhaps the most 
1  Apart from Keeley, also Wheelock (1992) with a data set on American depostory institutions of the 1930s and 
Park (1994) on American banks of  the 1980s find support for the moral hazard hypothesis. In contrast, Furlong 
(1988),  Schrieves and Dahl (1992), and Randall (1993) provide evidence which does not support the moral 
hazard hypothesis. 
7 spectacular boom-bust period in the industrialized market economies since the Great 
Depression. 
This paper aims at testing the moral hazard hypothesis as  an explanation of 
lending growth of  the Finnish banks in the late 1980s. More specifically the analysis 
focuses on the lending behaviour of the cooperative banks and savings banks in the 
period between the end of 1986 and the end of 1990. It is the period following the 
main measures of  deregulation in the financial markets and a period coinciding with 
an  exceptionally  rapid  growth  of credit  and  GDP.  The  two  banking  groups 
represented  over  half of the  Finnish banking  market  in  the  end of the  1980s. 
Furthermore, the savings bank group was the most expansionary among the banks in 
the 1980s and accounts for a disproportionately large share of the total losses during 
the crisis period? 
The analysis seeks to establish whether the bank-wise variation in bank lending 
is consistent with the moral hazard hypotesis. The analysis is thus partial in the sense 
that no attempt is made to examine factors which have been common to all banks. In 
particular  all  macroeconomic  factors  are  left  out  of the  analysis  as  are  such 
explanations of the banks supply behaviour, which are essentially the same for all 
banks. Thus common misperceptions about the risks involved in lending are not 
considered. 
The analysis is based on the simple value maximization model designed to fit 
the external circumstances of the Finnish local banks in VihriaIa (1996b). The results 
obtained will be interpreted primarily in the light of this model. However, when 
assessing the results I will also discuss the limitations of the benchmark model and 
speculate about alternative explanations for the findings. 
2  Moral hazard: what is it and how to test for it? 
The moral hazard argument says essentially that if the price a borrower pays for the 
borrowed funds does not incorporate a fair default premium, the borrower has an 
incentive to  use the funds to "too risky" investments: Under limited liability, the 
borrower need not pay for the funds, if the outcome of the risky investment is bad, 
but she obtains all of the returns exceeding the contractual commitment vis-a.-vis the 
lender. Thus an investment with the same expected return but with more return 
variability yields a higher expected return to the borrower. 
When applied to banking, the moral hazard story typically singles out flat-rate 
deposit insurance as the reason for the underpricing of funds. Given the guarantee by 
the deposit insurance scheme, the depositor need not - and due to competition cannot 
- demand a (sufficient) default premium. If  the price the bank pays for the insurance 
policy does not properly take into account the riskiness of the bank's portfolio, equity 
2 The aggregate net loss (profit/loss after extraordinary items and direct taxes) of the deposit bank 
sector in the period  1991  through  1995  was some FIM 62  billion (savings banks and  Skopbank 
consolidated). Of this the savings bank group account for FIM 36 billion. The regulatory capital was 
FIM 54 billion and FIM 10 billion for all banks and the savings bank group, respectively, at the end 
of 1990. The banking system has thus lost in the aggregate all of its capital, the savings bank sector 
doing so several times over. Furthermore, some losses are still pending for the savings bank sector, 
which account for some FIM 70 billion of  the total bank support commitment of  the authorities of FIM 
82 billion (including guarantees ofFIM 31  billion) at the end of 1995. 
8 holders  benefit  in  expected  value  sense  from  increasing the  riskiness  of bank 
portfolio. The incentive for high risk is the stronger, the less there is equity in the 
bank. Thus banks that have low net worth are particularly likely to take on high risks, 
to "play gamble for resurrection". As almost all existing formal.deposit insurance 
schemes are flat-rate, the potential for moral hazard induced by deposit insurance is 
rather universal.3 
But deposit insurance need not be the only reason for underpriced bank funding. 
In many countries bank creditors have often been bailed out by the authorities even 
in the absence of any formal guarantees. An implicit creditor protection policy has 
existed. It is quite natural that such policies have been taken into account in the 
pricing of bank debt.  As  a consequence, bank debt may have been underpriced 
relative to the failure risk, and exactly the same sort of incentive for taking excessive 
risks has been created as with the flat-rate deposit insurance. 
Regulation seeks to  alleviate moral hazard in banking by setting minimum 
standards for bank capital and by constraining banks' asset and liability choices. 
Supervisory authorities typically have powers to penalize the banks that do not meet 
the requirements, and in the extreme close the substandard banks. But of course 
supervision  may  fail  to  constrain  risk  taking  effectively.  And  in  the  extreme 
misconceived bank support may perversely reward capital inadequacy rather than 
penalize for it. 
Empirically credit risk of  lending is the main risk element that has influenced the 
Finnish banks' (and in general the Nordic banks') profitability and solvency in the 
recent banking crisis. An empirical analysis suggests furthermore that the extent of 
credit expansion during the boom years had a strong negative impact on asset quality 
(SoIttila and VihriaJli 1994). Thus the extent of credit expansion in a given period of 
time appears to be the main determinant of bank risk. 
The model in VihriaJli{ 1996b) describes how the extent of  risky lending depends 
on bank characteristics and demand conditions under different  pricing principles of 
marginal bank funding and under varying stiffness of capital regulation. 
The model assumes that equity and deposits and their costs are exogenous, but 
the bank can choose the amount money market debt and subordinated debt so as to 
finance the preferred amount of risky loans subject to a declining demand schedule. 
The bank is subject to a capital requirement, and the owners are penalized for a 
failure  to  meet  the  requirement  by  a  non-pecuniary  cost.  Although  equity  is 
exogenous, the bank can augment its regulatory capital through issuing fairly priced 
subordinated debt (up to a maximum set by regulation) and thereby diminish the 
expected penalty from capital insufficiency at any given level of lending. 
The solutions of  the model are of  two principal type. A bank that faces sufficient 
demand for loans borrows in the money market but does not invest in bonds. This 
type of bank can be assumed to be representative in the period of interest, as  the 
Finnish banks on average borrowed heavily in the money market. A second type of 
solution obtains, when demand for loans is so small that the relevant choice for the 
bank is how to allocate exogenously given capital and core deposits between risky 
3 An exception is the United States where the FDIC insurance premium is currently tied to bank risk, 
but even there the maximum price difference is only 8 basis points, see Berger et. al. (1995). Also 
some other countries have introduced a risk-related insurance premium or are in the process of doing 
so (Norway, Sweden). In Finland the deposit insurance premia are flat-rate, although the legislation 
would allow risk based premia as well. 
9 lending and safe bonds. In this case no money market funding is used. According to 
the model the behaviour of these types of  banks can differ a great deal depending on 
the level of loan demand and other parameters. 
Bank behaviour in the more relevant case of positive money market funding is 
more straigthforward, although it depends crucially on the pricing of money market 
debt and the stringency of capital regulation. The comparative statics of  bank lending 
with respect to the exogenous variables of the model are summarized for this type of 
bank in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Comparative statics of lending 
Penalty  Pricing  Penalty  Required  Equity  Deposit  Amount  Demand  Borrower 
for  of non- capital  capital  rate  of  quality 
capital  deposit  ratio  deposits 
insuffi- funding 
ciency 
Positive  fair  +  +  +(-)  + 
fixed  +/- +(-)  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
Zero  fair  0  0  0  0  +(-)  + 
fixed  0  +/- +  +/- +(-)  +(-) 
Negative  fair  +  +  +(-)  +(-) 
fixed  +  +/- +/- +(-)  +(-) 
+/-: both possible depending on circumstances 
+(  - ): both possible, but + more likely 
If  the·relevant marginal liability is fairly priced, or the penalty for not meeting the 
capital requirement (ex post) so stiff that it simulates unlimited liability of the equity 
holders, no moral hazard exists, and bank lending increases with the exogenous 
amount of equity (K) and decreases with costs (RD). Although the cost variable RD 
in Table 1 strictly speaking is the average cost of the exogenous deposits, it can be 
interpreted as any cost element such as the total costs of  banking premises, equipment 
and labour input to the extent these are exogenous in the relevant time horizon. 
However, if  pricing of  bank liabilities is not fully fair, or capital regulation is not 
extremely stiff, perverse effects may emerge. Unresponsive pricing of money market 
debt implies that higher costs do lead and smaller equity may lead to more lending. 
And with a sufficient underpricing of the money market debt even an increase in the 
core deposits D can lead to less lending. Similarily, even under fair pricing of the 
marginal funding of the bank, qualitatively the same perverse effects emerge, if 
capital insufficiency is rewarded through ill-conceived bank support policies. 
These comparative statics suggest using the empirical relationship between bank 
costs and capital on the one hand and bank lending on the other hand as a test for the 
moral hazard hypothesis. Should one find, ceteris paribus, a positive relationship 
between lending and costs and a negative relationship between lending and capital, 
the finding would be consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. No relationship 
would suggest of a relative unimportance of the consideration of bank default in 
lending decisions, either because no penalty is associated with capital ins  sufficiency 
or because lending is assumed by all relevant agents to be "sufficiently" safe under 
all  relevant circumstances.  Finally,  a positive relationship between lending and 
10 capital and a negative relationship between lending and costs would suggest that 
market forces  control risk taking through  risk premia (or rationing)  or that the 
regulators do  so  through  sufficient penalties  on  the banks that fail  to  meet the 
requirements. 
In addition, the issuance of subordinated debt can be informative about the 
pricing of marginal funds and/or stiffness of  capital regulation. Under fair pricing and 
positive penalties for capital insufficiency, the banks that rely on money market debt 
also use the maximum allowed amount of subordinated debt. With no penalty for 
capital insufficiency the amount of subordinated debt in indeterrnined, and with a 
negative penalty it is zero. Also underpricing of senior debt can lead to zero optimal 
subordinated debt. 
As with any test situation, the suggested test is conditional on the validity of the 
theoretical framework from which the hypothesis falls out as a special case. 
One potential caveat is that deposits, capital and costs may not exogenous in the 
relevant decision horizon, which is likely to be the average maturity of loans ie. 3-4 
years. Thus a bank that chooses to expand lending, say, in response to high demand 
may also wish to  attract more deposits through higher rates,  better transactions 
services, advertising, which all increase costs. Also seeking new loan customers is 
likely to increase costs.  One might thus observe a positive relationship between 
lending and costs even though no moral hazard exists. 
Actually, the problem of cost endogeneity is not likely to be too serious in the 
data used in this study. First, most deposit rates were regulated under the period 
consired in this study, suggesting that the scope for rate competition was  small. 
Second, panel data allows using cost variables dating prior to the period of credit 
extension studied, which should alleviate any possible simultaneity problems. In any 
case, the rate and deposit endogeneity can be tested by examining whether bank 
characteristics affect deposit rates and deposit volumes. 
In a sense, capital endogeneity is even less of a problem. First, the banks studied 
have not been able to use equity type of instruments to raise capital. Second, the 
issuance of subordinated debt is  explicitly analyzed in the theoretical model: the 
optimal stock is in most situations the (exogenous) maximum amount that can be 
counted towards regulatory capital. Third, also here one can take advantage of the 
panel nature of the data set. 
Another potential problem of  the proposed test (and the underlying theory) is the 
assumption that the agents know the probability distribution of lending returns. This 
may not be a valid assumption. All agents may well have a wrong view about the 
risks, and furthermore the banks may well know more than the investors in bank 
assets do. 
In the particular case of the boom-bust cycle of Nordic banking in the last 
decade, it has been often argued that no one understood correctly the risks related to 
lending against real estate security.4 Expanding lending rapidly may thus have been 
regarded by the banks as an essentially riskless way of increasing volume of  business 
4 See ego Pettersson (1993). 
11 and thereby lowering unit costs and increasing capital through retained earnings.5 
Finding that especially the weakly capitalized and high cost banks expanded lending 
strongly could be interpreted as indicating that these banks used the newly liberalized 
markets to adjust their unit costs and capital towards the industry average. Thus no 
moral hazard needs to be involved. 
Although the plausibility of the "lower unit costs through growth" or "riskless 
expansion" story is doubtful given the traditional view of the banking community 
about the riskiness  of rapid  expansion,  the  story  cannot not  rejected  a priori. 
Fortunately there may be a way of  distinguishing between the two explanations. If  the 
riskless expansion story holds, all banks should start to delecerate lending growth 
when the expectations change and the banks that have in the process assumed more 
risks than others should do so more clearly. In practice, many things suggest that the 
Spring of 1989  was  such a period of revision of expectations.  A  tightening  of 
monetary policy led to higher interest rates, and in particular the imposition of a 
special cash reserve requirement penalized lending growth. Stock and real estate 
prices peaked, and lending growth started to decelerate rapidly on the aggregate level. 
3  A preliminary look at the data 
3.1  The sample 
The data set consists of 333 cooperative banks and 150 savings banks. Thus almost 
all the banks that existed at the end of 1990 are included.6 The sample is balanced by 
aggregating the observations of the banks that merged during the sample period. 
The bank data contains annual balance sheet and income statement information 
for the years 1985 through 1990 augmented with information about regulatory capital 
adequacy.  A  description  of the  bank  data  and  their  sources  are  provided  in 
Appendix 1. 
For each bank, a geographical area of operation is defined as the municipalities 
in which the bank had the head office or a branch at the end of 1990. Data on 
demographic and economic conditions available on municipal level are aggregated 
over the operation area to construct variables that reflect the market conditions in 
every bank's local market. A list of the collected data is in Appendix 2. 
The period of the analysis is 1986 through 1990. The choice of this particular 
period for analysis is based on the observation that it covers the whole period of 
"credit boom" from the start of accelerating lending growth in the aftermath of 
financial  liberailization (see Vihrialii  1996a).  By the  end of 1990 bank lending 
stagnated and in 1991 credit stocks already fell. 
5 This explanation emerges very clearly from a recent savings bank history (Kuustera 1995). It assumes 
that there was excess capacity in the banking system. Expanding the volume of business would not 
increase essentially total costs so that unit costs would go down. Given the observed cuts in the use 
of  resources by the banks in the 1990s this assumption of excess capacity seems as such well-founded. 
6 The data set contains all savings banks. 5 cooperative banks are excluded because of data problems. 
The included banks account for 99.3 per cent of  the balance sheet total of the cooperative bank group 
at the end of 1990. 
12 The  banking  institutions  examined  are  limited  to  the  savings  banks  and 
cooperative banks, because these banks form a relatively homogenous group in terms 
of banking activities (almost no foreign banking business, very little activity in the 
capital  market  etc.)  while  still  comprising banks  with  highly varied  levels  of 
capitalization, costs, and growth of  lending in the period of  interest. Furthermore, the 
most severely hit banks during the subsequent crisis period - the savings banks 
which in 1992 formed the Savings Bank of Finland - are all included in the sample. 
3.2  Salient features of the cooperative banks and savings 
banks 
Group structure and decision making 
The cooperative banks and the savings banks form, respectively, two banking groups 
in the sense that several activities are coordinated within the respective groups, see 
Vihrihla (1996a). 
This group structure has potentially important implications for the analysis of the 
behaviour of  individual banks. First, it raises the question whether the decisions taken 
by an individual cooperative bank and savings bank can be considered independent, 
ie. whether the sample indeed contains a large number of independent observations. 
Although this is in the end an empirical question, there are reason to presume a 
considerable  degree  of independence  in  the  decision  making.  First,  legally  an 
individual bank and its management bear full responsibility for the commitments 
taken. Second, many accounts by insiders in the respective banking groups suggest 
that a well-run member bank cannot be forced to take decisions againts the will of  the 
management.7 Nevertheless, the central organizations very likely have been in the 
position to influence decisions of the member banks, and the policies in this regard 
may have been different across the two groups. 
A more precise implication is that the non-deposit funding ("money market 
debt" in the theoretical model) of an individual cooperative or savings bank can 
principle in  take  the  form  of either direct  funding  from  the  money market  or 
borrowing from the group's central bank. To the extent the member banks have not 
had a direct access to the money market (more likely for the smaller banks than the 
larger ones), the pricing of non-deposit funding may have differed across the two 
banking groups depending on the policies followed by the the two central banks.8 
7 For example, mergers among the member banks have taken place far more slowly than recommended 
by the central organizations on grounds of operational efficiency, see ego  Kuustera (1995). 
8 In addition, the fact non-deposit funding can have taken these two forms makes it very difficult to 
determine the  amount of money market funding,  as  the "claims of other banks" in the available 
statictics contain many types of instruments. Thus examining the determination of the amount of 
money market debt is not in practice possible with the data available. 
13 Lending and its funding 
Lending to the public financed by deposits by the public is the main business of both 
the cooperative banks and savings banks. In 1990 loans accounted for some 70 per 
cent of  these banks' total assets, while the deposit shares were 64 and 56, respectively 
(Table 2). 
Lending grew much faster in the savings bank group than in cooperative bank 
group in the second half of the 1980s, while the opposite is true for deposit growth. 
To facilitate the strong growth of lending, the savings banks increased substantially 
their debts to other banks (chiefly their central bank Skopbank) and to the money 
market. Also the cooperative banks increased borrowing from other banks (again 
chiefly from their central bank Okobank) and the money market, but the contributions 
of these sources were clearly smaller. 
The period of rapid growth of lending began in both banking groups in the 
Spring of 1987, and growth peaked at the end of 1988, when many transactions on 
enterprise ownership, induced by a tax reform, boosted both lending and deposit 
stocks considerably. In the Spring of 1989 lending growth started to  decelerate 
rapidly in response to policy changes and presumably changed expectations, as noted 
above. In this period of  deceleration, the savings banks expanded lending much faster 
than the cooperative banks. As there was no similar difference in the respective 
growth rates of deposits, the loan deposit ratio steadily increased in the savings bank 
group through the whole period while it stabilized in the cooperative bank group 
already in 1989 (Figure 1). 
Approximating  the  rate  of  growth  of lending  ALIL  by  the  differential 
A(LID)(DIL)  +  ADID  one can  decompose  the  change  in lending between  the 
contribution of change in the loan deposit ratio  and  the contribution of deposit 
growth. On the basis on the figures in Table 2, such a decomposition indicates that 
for the cooperative banks the contribution of the change in the loan deposit ratio was 
some 11 per cent. However, for the savings banks the contribution of the change in 
the loan deposit ratio was .35 per cent. Thus while other financing than deposits was 
just a marginal source of funding to the cooperative banks, over one third of the 
growth of lending of  the savings banks was financed from these non-deposit sources. 
A considerable part of the rapid growth of lending in the savings bank group 
originated in a relatively small number of  large banks. Nevertheless, also the average 
savings  bank expanded credit  much  faster  than  the  average  cooperative  bank, 
increasing  the  loan-deposit  ratio  significantly,  while  this  ratio  of the  average 
cooperative bank remained essentially unchanged between 1986 and 1990 (Table 3). 
The data exhibit a great deal of bankwise variation in the rate of growth of 
lending, much more so than in the rate of deposit growth. And the variability is much 
stronger among the  savings banks than  among the cooperative banks.  Thus the 
savings banks not only expanded strongly lending financed from other banks and the 
money market but many of them did so to an extreme extent. 
14 Table 2.  Bank balance sheet structure 
Cooperative banks*  Savings banks* 
Share in total assets, %  Rate of growth  Contribution to  Share in total assets, %  Rate of growth  Contribution to 
1986-1990, %  balance sheet  1986-1990, %  balance sheet 
End-1990  End-1986  growth 1986-1990  End-1990  End-1986  growth 1986-1990 
Percentage points  Percentage point 
Loans  72.7  74.4  85.4  63.5  70.2  72.1  122.5  88.3 
Bonds  3.8  3.1  132.8  4.2  2.0  2.9  56.3  1.6 
Receivables from Banks  12.3  13.2  77.4  10.2  11.4  13.1  99.1  13.0 
Other receivables  11.1  9.3  126.3  11.7  16.4  11.9  214.6  25.5 
Balance Sheet Total  100.0  100.0  89.6  89.6  100.0  100.0  128.5  128.5 
Deposits  64.1  71.4  70.3  50.2  55.9  77.2  65.3  50.4 
Claims by Banks  15.3  10.0  189.4  19.0  21.0  10.6  354.4  37.5 
Other Debts  14.5  13.2  107.7  14.3  16.6  7.3  420.7  30.7 
Capital & reserves  6.0  5.3  115.0  6.1  6.5  4.9  202.1  9.9 
~  __  deposit ratio  1.13  1.04  1.26  0.93  / 
l 
* The sector as a whole Figure  1.  Bank loans (L) and deposits (D) 
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16 Table 3.  Lending and its funding of the individual local banks 
Cooperative banks  Savings banks 
Average  Standard  Min.  Max.  Average  Standard  Min.  Max. 
deviation  deviation 
Growth of lending 1986-1990, %  69.9  29.8  -44.4  224.7  91.5  65.4  27.1  577.4  , 
Growth of deposits 1986-1990, %  68.7  17.2  -51.8  163.3  67.9  22.3  30.3  206.2 
Loan-deposit ratio  End-1986  1.03  0.16  0.56  1.76  0.96  0.15  0.50  1.56  I 
End-1990  1.03  0.20  0.48  2.27  1.08  0.29  0.46  1.93 
Change  0.00  0.15  -0.61  0.89  0.13  0.25  -0.21  1.00 
1986-1990 
Share in total assets: 
Debts to other banks  End-1986  0.09  0.06  0.00  0.47  0.12  0.07  0.02  0.38 
End-1990  0.13  0.10  0.00  0.58  0.19  0.15  0.00  0.75 
Net claims on other banks  End-1986  0.10  0.11  -0.37  0.83  0.06  0.13  -0.23  0.71 
End-1990  0.07  0.16  -0.48  0.93  0.00  0.21  -0.63  1.11 
Other debts  End-1986  0.05  0.05  0.01  0.66  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.14 
End-1990  0.06  0.07  om  0.60  0.11  0.10  0.01  0.44 
Capital and reserves  End-1986  0.053  0.012  0.025  0.101  0.052  0.015  0.022  0.094 
End-1990  0.061  0.015  0.016  0.108  0.066  0.017  0.020  0.132 Capital and capital adequacy 
Bank capital9 and reserves (provisions) on the balance sheet increased in the period 
of  interest not only in absolute terms but also relative to the balance sheet total. The 
savings banks increased capital more, and had on average somewhat better equity 
capital - asset ratios in 1990 (Table 4). 
Also the average capital ratios calculated for regulatory purposes increased in 
both bank groups in the second half of  the 1980s. The regulatory capital concept used 
until the beginning of 1991 included apart from the aforementioned capital items on 
the balance sheet half of the provisions for bad loan losses and subordinated debt up 
to a maximum.10 In contrast, the regulatory capital ratio calculated according to the 
new risk-based rules were on average somewhat better for the cooperative banks than 
for the savings banks at the end of 1990. 
Table 4.  Bank capital ratios, end of year 
1986  1990 
average  min  max  average  min  max 
Regulatory capital ratio  coops  4.75  2.39  14.7  5.881  1.661  13.71 
according to the pre- savings  4.51  2.34  9.46  6.111  2.001  15.71 
1991 rules, per cent 
Regulatory capital ratio  coops  13.2  2.38  35.7 
according to the 1991  savings  11.7  3.71  23.6 
rules, per cent 
Equity capital and  coops  5.32  2.56  10.1  6.17  1.63  10.9 
provisions per cent of  savings  5.22  2.23  9.4  6.62  2.06  13.3 
total assets 
Subordinated debt per  coops  18.5  0  384.3 
cent of tier-I capital  savings  1.8  0  32.2 
(1) end of 1989 
One obvious reason for the increase in the capital asset ratios in the late 1980s was 
the anticipated tightening of capital regulations. After being discussed among the 
authorities and the banking community over several years, the main lines of the 
reform became clear in 1988. Thus at least from that year onwards the banks were 
aware that a tightening would take place in the early 1990s.11 
The structure of capital differs somewhat between the two banking groups. The 
9 Equity capital in a broad sense consists of the balance sheet items share capital (commercial banks), 
primary capital (savings banks), cooperative capital (cooperative banks) plus reserve fund, equalization 
fund, and "distributable" equity. 
10 The data in Table 4 reports the regulatory ratio only for 1986 and 1989, as data do not exists for the 
end of 1990. 
11  Capital regulations and their changes are described in more detail in Appendix 3. 
18 "primary capital"  that corresponds  to  share capital of joint stock companies  is 
minuscule in the savings banks, reflecting the legal nature of  the savings banks. Also 
the corresponding "cooperative capital" of the cooperative banks is  a small but 
nevertheless much bigger fraction of  the total capital of the cooperative banks. Thus 
both banks have added to their capital mainly from retained earnings. 
What may be of some importance is that the savings bank group boosted its 
capital between  1986 and  1989 very significantly through value adjustments of 
particularly fixed property. FIM 1.7 billion or almost half of the increase in bank 
capital from FIM 1.5 billion to FIM 5.0 billion is accounted for by a change in the 
"equalization fund". The cooperative banks that have traditionally owned less fixed 
property did not and actually could not augment their capital significantly in this way; 
for them the increase in the equalization fund amounted to mere FIM 200 million in 
the same period. Given the highly inflated property prices in 1989, the additional 
capital based on the value adjustments soon turned out to be illusory. 
Subordinated debt has been of substantial importance for the cooperative banks 
in meeting the regulatory capital requirement even though most of the cooperative 
banks failed to utilize it up to the regulatory maximum. In contrast, subordinated debt 
remained relatively insignificant in the savings bank sector throughout the 1980s. 
In the beginning of the boom period operating costs ie.  other costs than interest 
expenses were higher (relative to the average total assets) in the savings bank group 
than in the cooperative banks. The savings banks also had marginally higher average 
deposit rates than the cooperative banks. However, by the end of the period the 
situation  had  changed.  The  savings  banks  had managed  to  reduce  the  ratio  of 
operating costs to average total assets substantially, while the ratio had remained 
largely unchanged for the cooperative banks. In contrast the difference in the average 
deposit rates had marginally increased (Table 5). 
Table 5.  Costs of individual local banks 
1986  1990 
average  min  max  average  min  max 
Average deposit rate, per  coops  4.60  3.86  6.71  6.27  5.02  9.17 
cent  savings  4.71  3.68  5.51  6.49  3.74  7.65 
"Other costs", per cent  coops  3.60  1.99  7.81  3.64  1.60  11.0 
of average total assets  savings  3.95  2.56  5.46  3.38  1.88  6.84 
19 4  Specification of the equations to be estimated 
The theoretical  model  implies  in  the  first  place  the  signs .of the  hypothesized 
relationships between lending on the one hand and capital, costs, demand variables 
and regulatory policy parameters  on  the  other hand.  What exact variables  and 
functional forms one should use is left to a large extent open. 
The principal empirical experiments consist of estimating regression equations 
for bank lending. The dependent variable in the regressions is the total lending to "the 
public" ie. enterprises and households. In a preliminary analysis it will be used in the 
rate of  growth form (eg. GL9086 will denote the per cent growth of  lending between 
the end of 1986 and the end of 1990). But, in most equations the dependent variable 
will be the change in the ratio of  loans to the core deposits over the period of interest, 
as will become clear shortly (eg.  ~LlD9086  denotes the change in the ratio of loans 
to deposits between the end of 1986 and the end of 1990). The deposit variable 
comprises all demand and time deposits issued by the bank (the growth is denoted by 
GD9086 etc.). 
In section 2 it was noted that deposits and deposit rates could in principle be 
endogenous. Some simple experiments reported in Appendix 4 suggest that in fact 
neither the growth of  deposit in 1986 through 1990 nor the average deposit rate seems 
to depend significantly on bank characteristics, in clear contrast to the rate of growth 
of  bank lending. The endogeneity problems does not appear serious. 
Whatever the determinants of  the loan stock are, it is unlikely that the observed 
stocks at any given time were the preferred ones in the presence of shocks and given 
the  usual  adjustment costs.  All  versions  of the  equation  contain  therefore  the 
beginning-of-the-period loan deposit ratio, LID. If  there is a common optimal long 
run LID ratio for the banking industry, one would observe a negative relationship 
between the level of the loan deposit ratio in the beginning of the period and the 
subsequent change in the ratio. 
Bank capital K should contain all the items that constitute the residual claim on 
bank assets. It will be operationalized as the sum of the book value of equity capital 
on the balance sheet and total reserves (general provisions for bad loan losses etc.). 
In the analysis the ratio of  capital and provisions over the balance sheet total, denoted 
by K/  A, is used. 
As far as the providers of money market funding are concerned the relevant 
capital measure might also contain subordinated debt. In addition, the supervisory 
authority may be most interested in the bank's capacity to meet the statutory capital 
requirement, according to which subordinated debt is included in the definition of 
capital. Therefore also the regulatory capital ratio, (K/  A)REG is experimented with. 
In the theory the exogenous cost element is the deposit rate, but as discussed 
earlier, also other exogenous costs should have an analogous effect. In the empirical 
analysis these two cost elements are analyzed separately, as their effect may differ 
depending among other things on the time frame within which these costs are likely 
to change. The deposit costs are proxied by the average deposit rate obtained by 
diving the interest expenses on deposits in a given year by the average deposit stock 
approximated by the average of the end-of-year deposit stocks; the variable name is 
20 RD. The other costs than interest costs, "operating cost", are measured by the ratio 
of the income statement item "other expenses" over the average balance total, Cl  A. 12 
According to the theory,  the potential moral hazard is strongest when both 
capital is low and costs are high. In addition, the if a.bank has that much capital. that 
it can meet its commitments under all possible (perceived) realizations of the loan 
returns, no moral hazard exists irrespective of costs and the principle of pricing of 
purchased funds. A way to incorporate these two effects is to replace RD and Cl  A by 
cross-terms  RD*((KlAyafe - KlA) and (C/A)*((KlAyafe - KlA), where (KlAyafe is 
a capital ratio assumed to be high enough to make bank debt safe. The moral hazard 
hypothesis predicts that these variables have a positive impact on lending.13 
To alleviate the potential problems of simultaneity, all of  the preceding variables 
are defined for the beginning of the period. Thus, when the dependent variable is the 
change in the loan deposit ratio between the end of 1986 and the end of 1990, the 
capital ratios refer to the end-of-1986 ratio and the costs to the year 1986 costs. 
Demand for loans is assumed to be related positively to the rate of growth of per 
capital income (.6.INC)  and negatively to the change in the rate of unemployment 
(~UNR)  over the period of interest. The banks that operated in the areas where the 
structure of the economy was tilted towards the most expansionary activities of the 
late 1980s - construction and services - probably faced higher demand for loans than 
the banks in the average areas. The share of construction and service employment 
CONSER is used to depict this influence. Similarily, given the relative increase of 
economic activity in the urban areas over a longer period of time, the share of urban 
population, URPOP, is included as a variable supposed to have a positive effect on 
the demand for loans. 
The aforementioned variables fallout rather directly from the theoretical model. 
As the model abstracts away from many aspects which may have been important for 
the observed patterns of lending growth, some variables are added to control for such 
potential effects. They are as follows. 
The access to borrowed funds is likely to be better for large banks than small 
ones, as the bigger banks are better known and, at least in the upper tail of the size 
distribution,  may  benefit  from  an  implicit  "too-big-to-fail"  guarantee.  Also 
management behaviour may have differed between large and small banks. Thus 
controlling for the size of the banking institution seems appropriate. As the size 
variable is used the log of the number of employees, denoted SIZE.  14 
A bank's lending behaviour is  likely to be affected by the local competitive 
conditions. The theory assumes that every bank faces a downward sloping demand 
curve  for  credit.  Its  position  and  slope  may be  dependent  on  the  presence  of 
competing banks in the local market. To incorporate these influences a dummy, CPO, 
12  The results  would  not change qualitatively if the two  cost variables  were  incorporated  in  an 
aggregated form, but the fit would be somewhat worse. 
13 Defining an appropriate "safe" capital asset ratio is naturally somewhat arbitrary. In the light of the 
losses made by the savings bank sector as a whole in the recent crisis three times the actual capital 
might have been sufficient. Although also other values for (KlA)"fe are experimented with, the value 
15 per cent will be used in the analysis. It  is about three times the average capital asset ratio and about 
1.5 times the maximum observed value in the sample. 
14 Having some other obvious size variable such as the amount of loans or total assets or the number 
of branch offices would not change the results as all of these are highly correlated. 
21 is defined. CPO obtains the value 1 if neither of the two largest commercial banks -
KOP and SYP - has a branch in the operation area of  the cooperative or savings bank 
analyzed and is 0 otherwise. 
As discussed above, the behaviour of the cooperative banks and the savings 
banks may have differed. It is therefore reasonable to allow the parameters to differ 
across the two banking groups. In a preliminary analysis such a difference is allowed 
for all parameters except the coefficients of the demand variables. The potential 
difference is incorporated by including savings bank dummies (SBDUMMY) for the 
intercept and the respective slope coefficients. 
Finally, there is the possibility that bank behaviour has been affected by factors 
not linked in any way to the maximization of  bank value. Criminal behaviour on the 
part of the management is a possibility. To control for such an effect we include a 
dummy variable obtaining value 1 for the banks which have been subject to criminal 
proceedings and 0 otherwise (CRIMPRO). Of course criminal behaviour may also be 
an extreme way of  maximizing bank value, but even in that case it is probably useful 
to separate such effects from more purely economic factors. 
The functional form of the estimated relationship is assumed to be linear in 
parameters. 
The basic equation to be estimated is thus of the following type. As noted RD 
and Cl  A may,  however, be replaced by the  somewhat more complicated terms 
incorporating the cross-effect of capital and costs. 
L  K  C 
gL =  ao  + al- + ~- + <sRD +  a4- + asgD + a6CP0 +  ~SIZE  + asLlINC 
D  A  A 
+a9LlUNR +alOCONSER +allURPOP +a12CRIMPRO  (1) 
+  ~a.sBDUMMY.  +u 
J  J 
where the a's and b's are the constants to be estimated and u and v are error terms. 
5  The estimation results 
This section reports the empirical results. First, the fully linear version of eq. (1) is 
estimated for the cross-section covering the years 1986 through 1990. Here different 
estimating techniques are used and behaviour of most variables is allowed to differ 
between  the  two  banking  groups.  These  preliminary  experiments  result  in  a 
condensed equation, where the dependent variable is the change in the loan deposit 
ratio Ll(UD), and where only a few parameters are allowed to differ between the two 
banking groups. The results for the whole period are reported in section 5.2. Section 
5.3 provides some checks of robustness. In section 5.4 the observation period is split 
into two subperiods, ie. the equation is estimated separately for the cross-sections 
covering the first two years 1986-1988 and the last two years 1988-1990. This is 
followed by an analysis of the behaviour of subordinated debt in section 5.5. Finally, 
section  5.6  reports  some  counterfactual  calculations  to  assess  the  quantitative 
significance of the observed moral hazard incentives. 
22 5.1  Preliminary experiments 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the specification (1) using first ordinary 
least squares (column (a)). The OLS results show that a large fraction of the cross-
sectional variation in loan growth can be explained by the included variables; R2 is 
over 70 per cent. Second, many bank characteristics and demand variables appear to 
exert  significant  influence  on  lending  growth,  including  several  savings  bank 
dummies.  However,  the  error  term  shows  serious  heteroscedasticity  and  non-
normality calling into question the validity of inference on the basis of the OLS 
results. 
The observed irregularity of the error term may in principle be due to a small 
number of highly extreme observations. One way of handling the problems would be 
exclude such observations from the sample, re-estimate the model with the truncated 
sample and examine the outliers separately. As discussed in section 2,  the banks 
facing very weak demand for loans relative to the core deposits might behave rather 
differently from the banks using non-deposit funding. Experiments with excluding 
small  numbers  of low  LID  observations  do  not,  however,  change  the  results 
essentially. The remaining sample is still plagued with the same problems of  the error 
term. Similarily, one might simply exclude the most extreme observation on the basis 
of the estimated residuals. But some attempts to that effect do not yield normal errors 
for the remaining sample either. 
An alternative is to leave the sample untouched and use estimation techniques 
which take into account the nature of the observed error term. Unfortunately, there 
is  no  obvious way of handling the two problems of heteroscedasticity and non-
normality simultaneously. We therefore estimate the equation on the one hand using 
least  squares  with the  heteroscedasticity correction  suggested by White  (1980; 
LSIHEC) and on the other hand using the least absolute deviations (LAD), which has 
been shown to perform well in relation to least squares with many types of non-
normal  disturbances,  see  ego  Harvey  (1981).  The  former  of these  alternartive 
estimation techniques affects only the standard errors while in the LAD estimation 
both the  point estimates  and  the  standard errors  in  general  deviate  from  those 
obtained by OLS. 
The results of these alternative estimations are reported in columns (b) and (c) 
in Table 6. As can be seen, the heteroscedasticity correction changes the standard 
errors and thus the t-values significantly. In particular, the significance of the savings 
bank dummies diminishes. Similarily, the point estimates in the LAD estimation 
differ substantially from the least squares estimates as  do  the t-values,  although 
qualitatively the results  are  in  many respects  similar.  A  particularly interesting 
observation is that while the coefficient of deposit growth GD9086 remains in all 
versions insignificantly different from unity, the positive savings bank slope dummy 
for that variable in the OLS estimation loses substantially in significance with the 
heteroscedasticity correction and turns insignificant in the LAD estimation. One may 
thus argue that if not too much weight is given to some exceptional observations, 
lending has responded with unitary elasticity to deposits. 
The unitary elasticity is in conflict with a literary interpretation of the underlying 
theoretical model. The model namely implies an  elasticity less than unity, and in 
some  specifications  zero  or  even  negative.  A  large  positive  response  would 
furthermore be likely under the circumstances when also capital has a positive effect 
23 on lending. Yet, in the estimated equations the capital variable obtains a negative 
coefficient. Two explanations are readily available. First, the deposit variable used 
in the empirical analysis contains - in addition to true core deposits - funding that 
is  in  effect  equivalent  to  money  market  debt.  However,  given. the. regulatory 
environment of the 1980s this does not appear plausible. And, as noted, the results 
on a deposit equation in Appendix 4 speak against this explanation. Another and 
more plausible explanations is that deposit growth proxies for growth of the local 
banking market not fully captured by the demand-for-Ioans variables used. 
The unitary elasticity of lending with respect to deposits suggests that imposing 
this constraint would not distort conclusions. In the sequel, we therefore replace the 
growth of  lending as the dependent variable by the change in the loan deposit ratio 
over the period of interest dropping deposit growth from the explanatory variables. 
This formulation highlights the role non-deposit funding as a determinant of lending 
growth. We also drop all the savings bank dummies which remain insignificant at the 
10 per cent level in LAD regressions. Actually the same dummies get excluded, 
whether one uses the purely linear specification or the specitication with the cross-
terms of eq. (1). We thus end up with the following functional specifications: 
L  L  K  C  !:::.- = ao + al- + a2- +  ll:3RD + a4- + asCP0 + a6SIZE +  ~!:::.INC 
D  D  A  A 
+a8!:::.UNR +~CONSER  +aloURPOP +aIICRIMPRO  (2) 
+ al2SBINTDUM + a13SBCOSTDUM + al4SBSIZEDUM + u 
L  L  K  KsafeK  C  KsafeK 
!:::.-=b  +b - +b - +b RD*(----)  +b -*(----)  +b CP0 
D  0  ID  2A  3  A  A  4A  A  A  S 
+ b6SIZE + b7dINC +  b8dUNR + b9CONSER +  blOURPOP  (3) 
+ all CRIMPRO +  bl2SBINTDUM + a13SBCOSTDUM 
+ al4SBSIZEDUM +v 
where the dependent variable is multiplied by 100 to scale the coefficients larger, 
SBINTDUM is the savings bank intercept dummy, SBCOSTDUM is the savings 
bank slope dummy for the cost term and SBSIZEDUM is the savings bank dummy 
for the size variable. 
Given that heteroscedasticity and non-normality of the error term cannot be 
handled simultaneously one either has  to examine the estimates based on least 
squares with heteroscedasticity correction and the LAD estimates throughout the 
analysis or choose between the  two.  For simplicity we choose to  use the more 
standard  least  squares  with  the  heteroscedasticity  correction.  However,  some 
calculations based on the equation estimated with least squares will be cross-checked 
by making the same computations based on corresponding LAD estimates. 
24 Table 6.  Results for the basic specification 
(a)  (b)  (c) 
Dependent variable  GL9086  GL9086  GL9086 
Estimation method  OLS  LSIHEC  LAD 
Explanatory variables  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value 
Constant  -76.6  -2.42***  -76.6  -1.87*  -25.3  -0.98 
LID  -19.5  -1.98**  -19.5  -1.82*  -27.9  -4.04*** 
Cap  -2.03  -1.77*  -2.03  -1.85*  -1.67  -2.12** 
RD  10.7  2.46***  10.7  2.03**  5.30  1.72* 
Cost  2.30  0.84  2.30  .59  -1.08  -0.74 
Size  4.06  2.13**  4.06  2.33**  4.31  2.92*** 
CPO  6.32  1.90*  6.32  2.28**  4.35  1.90* 
.1inc  0.2  1.73*  0.20  1.59  0.23  2.90*** 
.1unr  -0.22  -0.31  -0.22  -0.31  0.32  0.64 
Conser  12.5  1.13  12.5  0.97  4.13  0.64 
Urpop  37.8  4.54***  37.8  4.01***  40.1  7.77*** 
Crimpro  75.5  9.02***  75.5  3.77***  55.7  9.94*** 
GD9086  1.04  12.2***  1.04  9.60***  0.95  17.0*** 
D:Constant  -60.2  -1.05  -60.2  -0.76  -77.7  -1.70* 
D:LID  -7.40  -0.42  -7.40  -0.29  18.7  1.71 * 
D:Cap  -1.85  -1.04  -1.85  -0.87  -0.75  -0.63 
D:RD  -8.57  -0.99  -8.57  -0.75  -1.28  -0.21 
D:Cost  13.5  2.62***  13.5  2.03**  10.3  3.85*** 
D:Size  6.56  2.18**  6.56  1.85*  8.49  3.57*** 
D:CPO  6.50  1.05  6.50  0.95  9.06  2.14** 
D:GD9086  0.73  5.86***  0.73  1.77*  0.05  0.63 
Number of 
observations  .483  .483  .483 
ADJ. R2  .71  .71  .67 
White  282.6*** 
JB  388.2*** 
White: the White test statistic for homoscedasticity 
JB: the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality 
*, **, ***: the test statistic significant at the 10 %, 5 % or 1 % level, respectively 
The t-values are corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980), except in the LAD estimation. 
25 5.2  The basic ~(LID)  equations for the whole period 
The  least  squares  parameter  estimates  and  the  t-ratios  incorporating  the 
heteroscedasticity correction for the specifications (2) and (3) are reported in columns 
(d) and (e) of Table 7. When the parameters are allowed to differ between the two 
banking groups, the table reports the coefficient estimates for both types of banks in 
the same way ie. the savings bank estimate incorporates the dummy effect. For the 
non-linear version the table contains also the derivatives of the dependent variable 
with respect to the capital and cost variables. Finally, the table reports the X 2 tests for 
the joint significance of the capital and cost variables on the one hand and the four 
demand variables on the other hand. 
The first observation is that the two specifications tell an essentially similar story 
about the determinants of the loan deposit ratio and thus bank lending. There is no 
difference in fit, and comparable parameters are of the same order of magnitude. 
Second, both demand factors as a group and most bank characteristics are highly 
significant. Thus excluding either would be misleading. Furthermore, all  of the 
demand variables obtain coefficients with the expected signs. Both the change in 
income and the share of  urban population have significant positive effects on the loan 
deposit ratio. 
Third,  the  message  about  the  effect of capital  and  costs  is  striking:  both 
specifications suggest that capital exerts a negative impact on the change in the loan 
deposit ratio while both the deposit rate and the ratio of other costs over total assets 
exert positive effects.  In the linear specification all the relevant parameters are 
significant at the I per cent level with the exception the "other cost" variable for the 
cooperative banks. In the non-linear specification, even that term turns marginally 
significant. To the extent the effects are allowed to differ between the two banking 
groups, they are significantly stronger for the savings banks. Thus the findings are 
consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis for both types of banks but much more 
strongly so for the savings banks than for the cooperative banks. 
Fourth, bank size has a clear positive effect on the change in the loan deposit 
ratio. This suggests that particularly large banks benefited from the new opportunities 
of financing lending with non-deposit funding in the second half of the  1980s. 
Interestingly, the size effect is significantly larger among the savings banks than the 
cooperative banks. 
Fifth, absence of commercial bank competition in the local market seems to 
increase loan growth of the local bank. In the context of the simple background 
model, this may be simply due to the fact that the dummy proxies for geographical 
variation in loan  demand not captured by the demand variables.  But it  is  also 
consistent with some recent ideas about the effect of bank competition on lending 
when product markets  are  imperfectly competitive,  see  Koskela and Stenbacka 
(1995). 
Sixth, the banks whose managements are suspected for criminal activity by the 
authorities clearly increased the loan deposit ratio faster than other banks. 
Finally, the results  give some support for convergence towards  a common 
industry-wide loan deposit ratio, as the coefficient of  the beginning-of-the-period loan 
deposit ratio is negative. 
26 Table 7.  The constrained linear and non-linear specifications 
(d)  (e) 
Dependent variable  boLID9086  boLID9086 
Explanatory variable  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value 
Constant,  CB's  -49.9  -3.11***  -82.1  -3.47*** 
SB's  -80.7  -4.73***  -105.4  -4.40*** 
LID  -11.1  -1.90*  -9.7  -1.69* 
Cap:  -1.42  -2.92***  3.71  2.45** 
RD  -6.68  2.98*** 
RD*(15-Cap)  0.71  2.82*** 
Cost  CB's  1.89  1.15 
SB's  8.42  3.58** 
Cost*(15-Cap)  CB's  0.28  1.70* 
SB's  0.73  3.36*** 
Size  CB's  2.80  2.92***  2.48  2.64*** 
SB's  5.53  4.26***  5.51  4.19*** 
CPO  4.57  2.92***  4.45  2.83*** 
boinc  0.18  2.48**  0.19  2.62*** 
bounr  -0.25  -0.63  -0.22  -0.58 
Conser  8.31  1.35  8.36  1.33 
Urpop  19.6  3.90***  19.8  3.95*** 
Crimpro  44.4  7.00***  44.5  6.79*** 
Derivatives W.r.t.  Coops  Savings 
Cap  -0.56  -2.50 
RD  6.87  6.93 
Cost  2.72  7.10 
Number of 
observations  483  483 
ADJ. R2  .51  .51 
Tests of  joint significance (significance levels) 
Coops  Savings  Coops  Savings 
Cap & RD & Cost  .0002  .0000  .0214  .0000 
Demand  .0000  .0000 
*,  **, ***: the test statistic significant at the 10 %, 5  % or 1 % level, 
respectively 
The t-values are corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) 
27 5.3  Some checks of specification and robustness 
Every model specification and every choice of sample is just one among many a 
priori reasonable alternatives. It is therefore useful to check how the results would 
change if some important choices had been made differently. 
One question is the choice of  the capital variable. The used ratio of  equity capital 
and reserves (provisions) to total assets seems natural from the point of view of the 
theoretical model. But as discussed above, the regulatory capital ratio may also be 
relevant. The KJA variable in the linear version (4) in Table 7 is therefore replaced 
with the appropriate regulatory capital ratio (KJ A)REG which includes subordinated 
debt but excludes some provisions and uses a slightly different scaling factor. The 
estimation results of an equation modified in this way are reported in column (t) in 
Table 8. It turns out that the regulatory capital ratio does not have any association 
what so ever with the dependent variable while the estimated effects of the cost 
variables remain essentially unchanged. The relevant capital concept thus seems to 
be the original variable most closely resembling the equity capital concept of the 
theoretical model. 
Also two other issues pertaining capital may be important. As noted above and 
discussed more thoroughly in  Appendix 3,  capital regulation changed as  of the 
beginning of 1991.  That this  type  of change would very likely take  place,  was 
probably understood in the banking community at least since 1988. The change 
implied a tightening of the requirement in general and in particular for those banks 
which had more than the average share of  loans to the public in their assets. The latter 
effect can be tested with our cross-section data, as one can compute an estimate for 
the change in the regulatory capital ratio due to the regulatory change for every bank. 
Such a variable, denoted AREG, should according to the theoretical model have a 
negative effect on lending.15 
Secondly, as discussed above many savings banks added substantially to their 
equity capital through value adjustments mainly related to fixed property. One may 
suspect that these banks were behaving differently from those who did not seek to 
expand their capital base in this, ex post highly illusory, way. To check for this 
possibility one specification of the equation is augmented with the variable V  AD/K 
which measures the share of cumulative net value adjustments ("equalization fund") 
in total equity capital plus reserves at the time when the cumulative value adjustments 
peaked (1989). 
Column (g) in Table 8 reports the results when the two additional variables are 
included; due to missing data the sample is somewhat smaller than in the earlier 
regressions. The results give some support to the conjecture that the change in the 
capital regulation that took place in 1991 indeed constrained bank lending already in 
the late 1980s. Furthermore, allowing for this effect in no way alters the earlier results 
supporting the moral hazard hypothesis. 
15  The variable t.REG is computed by subtracting from the end-of-1990 regulatory capital ratio 
calculated according to the old rules a corresponding estimated ratio according to the new rules. As 
data on the old ratio for the end of 1990, (KJA)REG(90) , were not available, the ratio was estimated by 
(KJ A)REG(89)*(KJ A)(90)/(KJ  A)(89), where KJ A(90) is the ratio of equity capital and reserves over total 
asset used elsewhere in the analysis. Due to missing data, t.REG cannot not be calculated for 23 banks 
of the original sample. 
28 Table 8.  Some alternative specifications 
(t)  (g)  (h)  (i) 
HighLID90  LowLID90 
Dependent variable  LlLID9086  ALID9086  LlLID9086  LlLID9086 
Explanatory  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
variable  (t-value)  (t-value)  (t-value)  (t-value) 
Constant,  CB's  -72.1 ***  -62.1 ***  -80.4**  23.3 
(-4.19)  (-2.90)  (-2.53)  (1.04) 
SB's  -101.9***  -87.6***  -99.8***  25.7 
(-5.59)  (-3.96)  (-3.09)  (1.13) 
LID  9.28  -12.9**  -21.6***  -51.8*** 
(-1.58)  (-2.26)  (-2.72)  (-6.65) 
Cap:  0.14  3.14**  4.59**  0.17 
(-.34)  (2.35)  (2.30)  (0.13) 
RD  8.28*** 
(3.47) 
RD*(15-Cap)  0.60***  0.93***  0.12 
(2.67)  (2.96)  (0.61) 
Cost  CB's  2.72 
(1.69) 
SB's  8.26*** 
(3.36) 
Cost*( 15-Cap) CB's  0.22  0.21  0.15 
(1.37)  (0.96)  (0.86) 
SB's  0.71 ***  0.66**  0.08 
(3.28)  (2.52)  (0.45) 
Size  CB's  2.49***  2.48***  0.99  2.64*** 
(2.64)  (2.59)  (0.81)  (2.83) 
SB's  6.14***  5.30***  3.49**  2.79* 
(4.40)  (4.12)  (2.33)  (1.76) 
CPO  4.79***  3.11 **  4.47**  -0.13 
(3.07)  (2.06)  (2.49)  (-0.09) 
Llinc  0.15**  0.14**  0.26***  0.04 
(2.30)  (2.02)  (3.09)  (1.01) 
Llunr  -0.32  -0.26  -0.17  -0.61 
(-0.81)  (-0.70)  ( -0.42)  ( -1.15) 
Conser  9.07  9.42  7.74  5.97 
(1.43)  (1.48)  (1.37)  (-0.87) 
Urpop  18.4***  15.7***  24.9***  2.84 
(3.59)  (3.04)  (4.24)  (-0.67) 
29 (t)  (g)  (h) 
HighLID90 
Dependent variable  ~L1D9086  ~L1D9086  ~L1D9086 
Explanatory  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
variable  (t-value)  (t-value)  (t-value) 
Crimpro  42.9***  45.9***  41.3*** 
(6.64)  (6.45)  (6.40) 
~Reg  -0.53* 
( -1.85) 
Vad/K  0.05 
(0.68) 
Coops  Coops  Coops 
Derivatives w.r.t.  Savings  Savings  Savings 
Cap  -0.41  -0.45 
-2.51  -2.41 
RD  5.84  9.03 
5.90  9.12 
Cost  2.09  2.03 
6.95  6.47 
Number of 
observations  483  460  362 
ADJ. R2  .50  .53  .57 
Tests of  joint significance (significance levels) 
Coops  Coops  Coops 
Savings  Savings  Savings 
Cap & RD & Cost  .0035  .040  .029 
.0002  .0002  .0004 
Demand  .0000  0.0001  .0000 
*, **, ***: the test statistic significant at the 10 %, 5 % or 1 % level, respectively 





















.54 In principle this finding that the tightening of capital regulation (increase in k in the 
theoretical model) can even be used to discriminate between the two sources of  moral 
hazard:  underpricing of non-deposit funding  and  anticipation  of perverse bank 
support policies  (rewarding capital insufficiency,  c < 0) ..  The negative effect is 
namely consistent with the underpring hypothesis but inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that bankers expected that capital insufficiency would be rewarded. Nevertheless, 
given that the exact significance level of the ilREG coefficient is as high as  .064, 
strong conclusions are not warranted. 
In contrast, the degree to which the banks used value adjustments as a way to 
boost capital did not matter for growth of lending (column (g) in Table 8). 
The theory suggests that the relationship between bank lending and various 
exogenous factors is more predictable for the banks which fund themselves in the 
money market than for the highly liquid banks, whose essential decision problem is 
to allocate an exogenous amount of capital and deposits between risky lending and 
bonds. Unfortunately, there is no way of classifying the banks with any degree of 
certainty into the two categories on the basis of available data. One can nevertheless, 
compare how well the specified model fits for those banks which had low LID ratios 
with how well the model fits  for the supposedly more standard banks that used 
significant amount of non-deposit funding.  Columns (h) and (i) in Table 8 report 
estimates for two subsamples constructed on the basis of the 1990 LID ratio. The 
results in column (h) are obtained by using only the observations, for which the 1990 
un  ratio was within the three top quarters (75 per cent from the top), and the results 
in column (i) relate to the banks with the lowest quarter of the LID ratios. 
The results differ quite a bit. As predicted by the theory, the equation fits much 
better for the high LID banks than for the low LID banks in terms of both R  2 and 
number of significant coefficients. In particular the effects of capital and costs are 
insignificant for the low un  banks, while for the high LID banks the results are very 
close to those obtained for the whole sample. Qualitatively the capital and cost effects 
are the same in both subsamples. Therefore and as there is no obvious cut-off point, 
no attempt is made to eliminate from the sample any given number banks with small 
LID ratios. 
5.4  Stability over time 
The examined period of credit expansion is relatively long spanning the years 1987 
through 1990. This as such raises the question whether bank behaviour remained 
essentially the same over the period. Furthermore, as hinted in section 2, examining 
the potential changes in bank behaviour around the early 1989 may tell something 
about the reasons for why high cost banks expanded lending more than others. 
Table 9 reports estimation results for the non-linear specification (4) for the 
periods 86-88 and 88-90. For the former period, column (j), the model is  fully 
analoguous with the whole period version of the earlier tables. Thus the exogenous 
variables are dated either at the beginning of the period or, as in the case of income 
growth and change in the unemployment rate, over the period of interest. For the 
latter period two different versions are reported. The first one, column (k) is again 
fully analoguous with the whole period model; the exogenous variables are dated at 
the end of 1988 or over the period end of 1988 through end of 1990. In the second 
31 version,  column  (l),  the  end-of-1988  exogenous  variables  are  replaced  by  the 
corresponding end-of-1986 variables. 
Several interesting differences exist between the subs ample results. First, the fit 
is much worse for the first subperiod than the second. Particularly the demand factors 
appear to influence credit growth very little in the first period while they are very 
important in the latter period. 
Second, for all subsample regressions the fit is worse than the for the period as 
a whole. This suggests that the banks' horizon for lending decisions is relatively long. 
At least during the growth period banks seem to have abided largely by the same 
strategy for the whole period. A practical implication is  that the data set cannot 
usefully be analyzed year by year even though such an analysis would add the number 
of observations and would at least in principle allow modelling also time-dependent 
effects  such  as  that  of the  general  level  of interest  rates.  In  other  words,  the 
phenomenon under examination is  of such duration that doing full-fledged panel 
analysis  with,  say,  annual  observations  would  be futile:  splitting the period of 
observation  generates  random  variation  in  the  dependent  variable  rather  than 
informative observations. 
Third, comparing the first period results with analogous second period results, 
column (k) suggests of a remarkable change in the capital and cost effects: the moral 
hazard incentives seem to vanish, no significant effects can anymore be detected. 
Taking  this  at  the  face  value,  one  might  conclude  that  the  observed  positive 
relationship  between  costs  and  lending  and  the  observed  negative  relationship 
between capital and lending for the period as  a whole and for the first subperiod 
would not represent deliberate risk taking. Rather it would appear to be motivated by 
an attempt to reduce unit costs and increase capital through growth in an environment 
where risks of  rapid growth were not at all understood by the bankers or their lenders. 
According to  this  story,  behaviour changed radically when  the  macroeconomic 
prospects turned for worse in the early 1989 and bankers as well as perhaps their 
lenders became aware of potential credit risks.  Thus the popular explanation the 
banks' credit growth that was  called in  section 2 the "lower unit costs through 
growth"  or "riskeless  expansion"  story  rather than  moral  hazard  would be  the 
explanation for the observed bank-wise variation in lending growth.  However, a 
closer look suggests that quite the opposite is plausible in the light of the data of this 
analysis. 
32 Table 9.  Estimates for the sub-periods 
(j)  (k)  (I) 
EXOG.: 1988  EXOG.: 1986 
Dependent variable  LlLID8886  LlLID9088  ilLID9088 
Explanatory variable  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  tcvalue 
Constant,  CB's  -28.5  -1.67*  -16.8  -0.91  -53.9  -3.76*** 
SB's  -33.7  -1.94*  -35.4  -2.05**  -72.5  -4.98*** 
LID  -1.53  -0.43  -12.3  -3.47***  -8.66  -2.24** 
CAP:  1.36  1.23  -0.26  -0.23  2.56  2.91*** 
RD*(15-Cap)  0.29  1.81*  0.19  0.96  0.45  2.60*** 
Cost*(15-Cap)  CB's  0.08  0.69  -0.15  -1.21  0.20  1.87* 
SB's  0.30  1.99**  0.08  0.55  0.45  2.78*** 
Size  CB's  2.29  3.30***  1.14  1.65  0.15  0.19 
SB's  1.09  1.27  5.80  5.22***  4.35  4.04*** 
CPO  1.31  1.36  4.07  3.20***  3.25  2.49** 
Llinc  -0.01  -0.18  0.17  2.00**  0.17  1.87* 
Llunr  -0.22  -0.54  -0.02  -0.07  0.04  0.11 
Conser  -0.26  -0.08  12.5  1.87*  11.9  1.81 * 
Urpop  7.89  2.32**  16.7  4.18***  12.7  3.35*** 
Crimpro  9.94  2.14**  36.2  5.06***  35.0  5.10*** 
Derivatives W.r.t.  Coops  Savings  Coops  Savings  Coops  Savings 
Cap  -0.29  -1.20  -0.67  -1.57  -0.24  -1.34 
RD  2.87  2.89  1.83  1.78  4.39  4.44 
Cost  0.78  2.89  -1.45  0.77  1.94  4.36 
Number of 
observations  483  483  483 
ADJ. R2  .17  .46  .47 
Tests of  joint significance (significance levels) 
Coops  Savings  Coops  Savings  Coops  Savings 
Cap & RD & Cost  0.221  0.010  .195  .045  .014  .0005 
Demand  .174  .0000  .0002 
*, **, ***: the test statistic significant at the 10 %, 5 % or 1 % level, respectively 
The t-values are corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) 
33 Bank lending is  business where revenues are  earned up-front.  Various fees  and 
charges turn in at the beginning of  the loan contract. In addition, hardly any customer 
fails to pay interest on newly taken debt. Debt service problems emerge typically 
towards the end of the contract period.  16 This is likely to be particularly characteristic 
for the so-called "bullet" loans, ie. loans where the full principal is paid back at the 
maturity. These loans became very popular in the late 1980s, particularly among the 
savings banks. Thus the banks which in 1987 and 1988 had rapidly expanded their 
lending not only managed to reduce their unit costs but also posted high profits and 
thereby added to their capital base. Therefore, if the banks which had adopted a 
growth strategy in the early phase of the credit boom period continued the same 
strategy in the latter period, there might not be any relationship between the 1988 
capital and cost and the subsequent lending growth. This is what one observes in 
column (k). 
But, if  this conjecture of unchanged lending strategies holds, and it is supported 
by the earlier observation that the fit is better for the period as  a whole than the 
subperiods, one should find the same significant capital and cost effects in the second 
version (col.  1) of the latter period as for the first subperiod. In the version (1) the 
capital and costs variables are namely dated at 1986, prior to the improvement caused 
by the early credit growth. And this is exactly what one finds in column (1). In fact, 
the perverse cost effects seem to be even stronger for this period than for the first 
period. Noteworthy is that these stronger effects obtain, even if also some other 
interesting variables obtain much larger coefficients in col. (1) than in col. (j). Thus 
the coefficient of the criminal process dummy more than triples, even though it was 
significant to begin with. Similarily, the size effect quadradouples for the savings 
banks between the two periods. 
The evidence lends thus support to the conclusion that the low capital, high cost 
banks  which  chose  a  strategy  of rapid  growth  in  the  aftermath  of financial 
liberalization,  continued  if  not  sharpened  this  lending  policy  when  the 
macroeconomic prospects turned for worse in  1989.  Rapid growth was pursued 
especially by large savings banks and banks in which signs of criminal behaviour 
were later detected. This pattern fits very well with the moral hazard explanation. In 
contrast, it is difficult to reconcile with the idea that the banks expanded lending in 
1987 through 1990 because they did not understand risks, as in this case one would 
have expected the  banks  to  change  their behaviour radically in a  conservative 
direction once the external conditions changed for worse. 
5.5  The behaviour of subordinated debe7 
Moral hazard may, according to the underlying theoretical model, result either from 
undepricing of  bank liabilities or perverse enforcement of capital regulation. As noted 
in section 2, banks' choice of the amount of subordinated debt can be informative 
16 Default premia in the interest rate further increase the up-front nature of the earnings on risky bank 
lending. 
17 The date on subordinated debt is based on the files of Statistics Finland. The aggregate so obtained 
for the cooperative bank group does not precisely correspond to what the group reports. There is, 
however, no practical way to identify the source ofthe discrepancy. 
34 about the nature of  liability pricing or capital regulation. More specifically, if pricing 
is fair and the bank is penalized with a positive penalty for capital insufficiency, the 
banks which use money market debt also issue the maximum allowed amount of 
subordinated debt. In the case of zero penalty no specific amount of subor.dinated 
debt is implied, and inthe case of negative penalties the optimal subordinated debt 
volume is zero. Also the underpricing of  senior liabilities may results in zero optimal 
subordinated debt irrespective of the sign of the penalty parameter. 
It was already noted above that the cooperative banks typically used relatively 
much subordinated debt in the late 1980s while most savings banks had no such debt 
at all.  This broad observation is consistent with the results of the loan equation 
regressions:  the potential problem of moral hazard was  more serious among the 
savings banks than among the coopertative banks. 
But to really be able to draw the conclusion that the patterns of subordinated debt 
are in line with the results of the loan equation one needs to check that the issuance 
of subordinated debt by individual banks conforms with what the theory predicts. 
There are two important predictions in this regard. First, that the banks that issue the 
maximum amounts  of subordinated  debt  indeed  are  banks  that  use  non-trivial 
amounts of non-deposit funding (have high LID's). Second, that the banks which 
issue  most  subordinated  debt  are  also  weakly  capitalized,  as  the  function  of 
subordinated debt is to alleviate the problem of insufficient relulatory capital. 
In Figure 2,  I have plotted the ratio of subordinated debt over tier-I capital 
(SUBSHA;  per cent) against the LID  ratio and the total regulatory capital ratio 
(CAPRAT) at the end of 1990. The maximum amount of subordinated debt which 
is counted as regulatory capital is 50 per cent of tier-I capital. 
As  can be seen no  savings bank utilized in full  the possibility to augment 
regulatory capital with subordinated debt. In contrast, several cooperative banks had 
subordinated debt outstanding well in excess of the regulatory maximum and quite 
many more were close to the maximum. Yet, even most cooperative banks were 
below the maximum, suggesting that also within this group many banks perceived the 
problems of capital inadequacy relatively small or the senior money market funding 
was attractively priced relative to subordinated debt. 
Importantly, there is a clear positive relationship between SUBSHA and LID, as 
required by the theory. This is particularly so for the cooperative banks but it may 
exist also among the savings banks. 
Plotting SUBSHA againts the regulatory capital concept CORRA  T also displays 
rather  systematic  behaviour.  18  The  banks  that  issue  significant  amounts  of 
subordinated debt are at the low end of the regulatory capital ratio. This is  again 
clearly  in  line  with  the  theoretical  model,  according  to  which  the  value  of 
subordinated debt for the bank pertains to capital adequacy. 
18  Essentially the same type of scatters would emerge if the plots were against tier-I capital ratio or 
KJ A. The banks that utilized most subordinated debt thus did not manage to improve their regulatory 
capital ratios so as to make them rank very differently in an ordering of  regulatory capital ratios. le. 
subordinated debt worked to alleviate insufficiency of regulatory capital, not to eliminate it. 
35 Figure 2. 
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2 Importantly, the negative relationship between capital adequacy and issuance of 
subordinated debt also suggests that the issuance activity is governed by the supply 
side: Issuance by some banks is small because these banks prefer small amounts of 
such debt, not because buyers of subordinated debt had charged high lemons premia 
and at the extreme rationed such risky lending to the banks. If  the latter factor had 
been dominant, one would expect to see the better capitalized banks having issued 
in relative terms more than the weakly capitalized banks. Also the observation that 
some cooperative banks issued subordinated debt several times over the regulatory 
maximum suggests that pricing or availability of subordinated debt was no problem. 
To ensure that the two partial relationships, which individually conform with the 
underlying theory, obtain also simultaneously, a Tobit model for the end-of-1990 
SUBSHA was estimated. The explanatory variables are constant, un, KI  A and bank 
size. Bank size is included to account for possible differences in the access to the 
market of subordinated debt by banks of different size; small banks presumably have 
higher unit costs of transaction and are likely to face higher lemons premia if such 
premia exist. The un  ratio in the analysis is adjusted by deducting the amount of 
subordinated debt from the loan stock to make the ratio reflect more precisely the 
extent to which lending was financed with senior non-deposit funding. The results 
are reported in Table 10. 
Table 10.  Tobit models for SUBSHA90 
A. The Cooperative Banks 
Number of observations 332(1), of which 
324 have positive values for 
SUBSHA90 
Explanatory  Coefficient  t-value 
variables 
Constant  -10.4  -0.81 
LID(2)  37.7  4.16*** 
KJA  -4.19  -3.72*** 
Size  5.62  3.15*** 
Log of likelyhood function = -1555.6 
(1) Data on some variables missing. 
B. The savings Banks 
Number of observations 128(1), of which 
27 have positive values for SUBSHA90 
Explanatory  Coefficient  t-value 
variables 
Constant  -7.29  -0.46 
LlD(2)  -6.34  -0.68 
KJA  -3.55  -2.40** 
Size  6.32  3.30*** 
Log oflikelyhood function = -139.6 
(2) In the calculation of the ratio, the amount of subordinated debt is subtracted from L. 
The results confirm the bivariate negative relationship between bank capitalization 
and issuance of subordinated debt: weakly capitalized banks use more subordinated 
debt than others. It is  important that the negative relationship obtains even after 
controlling for bank size, which as expected, exerts a positive impact on issuance of 
subordinated  debt.  However,  the  positive  relationship  between  the  issuance  of 
subordinated debt and the LID ratio is significant only for the cooperative banks. 
In sum, the local banks' issuance of subordinated debt has behaved broadly as 
predicted by the underlying theory. Its behaviour is furthermore consistent with the 
37 results obtained with the loan regressions. Although banks used subordinated debt to 
improve their regulatory capital ratios in the late 1980s, only a small fraction of  them 
did so to the extent allowed by regulations. That they did not do so seems furthermore 
depend on their own choice rather than possible lemons premia or.rationing.in the 
market for subordinated debt. 
As in the loan regressions, there is an important difference in the behaviour of 
subordinated debt between the cooperative banks and the savings banks. The moral 
hazard incentives, which are suggested for both types of banks, seem to have been 
much stronger among the savings banks than the cooperative banks. 
5.6  The quantitative significance of moral hazard 
Even though the results suggest that moral hazard has affected banks' credit supply 
in the boom period, the test results do not yet quantify its importance in a concrete 
manner. One way of doing this is to make counterfactual calculations about what the 
expansion of credit had been according to the model in the cooperative bank and 
savings bank sectors, had bank capital been sufficient to eliminate most if not all 
moral hazard. 
The calculations utilize a decomposition of lending growth into the changes of 
the individual banks' loan deposit ratios and deposit growth: 
(4) 
where  ~(L/Di) is the change in the loan deposit ratio for bank i predicted by the 
model, D/L and L/L are ratios of bank i deposits and loans over the aggregate loans, 
respectively, and ~D/Di  is the rate of deposit growth in bank i. The decomposition 
thus weighs together the predictions for individual banks to arrive at an aggregate 
growth of credit prediction. In doing so it allows a big bank to affect the sectoral 
outcome according to its actual size, not just with the weight of an observation in the 
total samples of 333 or 150 banks. 
The hypothetical prediction of credit growth in the absence of moral hazard is 
computed by setting the capital asset ratio KI  A at the beginning of the period at 15 
per cent for all banks in the nonlinear specification of the capital and cost effects. 
This implies that the cross terms vanish from the equation. As roughly tripling the 
average capital asset ratio is a rather demanding requirement, also the counterfactual 
prediction with the capital asset ratio at 10 per cent (about the maximum observed 
ratio in the sample) is computed. The calculations are done for three specifications: 
The first one is the specification (e) of Table 7, where the parameters are estimated 
with least squares and some important parameters are allowed to differ between the 
two banking groups. The second one is the same structure, but the estimation method 
is  LAD. The third version is based on least squares estimation of a specification 
where the behaviour is imposed to be the same across the two banking groups, ie. the 
savings bank dummies of the earlier versions are eliminated. 
The  results  are  reported  in  Table  11.  The  first  line  provides  an  overall 
benchmark by showing what the growth rates  were for the two banking groups 
38 separately and combined when using the decomposition (4) with the true ~(LID) 
values. For every estimated specification, the first line reports what the predicted 
sectoral growth rates is using the true capital ratios KI  A. Comparing these to the 
overall  benchmark  constitutes  a  sector  level  indicator  of the  goodness .of  fit. 
Comparing the counterfactual computations with the prediction with the true KIL 
ratios in turn provide measures of the quantitative importance of moral hazard. 
The first observation is that the version allowing behaviour to differ between the 
two banking groups and using least squares as the estimation method produces almost 
precisely the same rates of growth as the decomposition with the true LID ratios. In 
contrast, the prediction based on the LAD estimates underestimates growth in both 
sectors.  Similarily,  imposing  the  same  behaviour  on  all  banks  leads  to  an 
overestimation of the cooperative banks' rate of growth and an underestimation of 
the savings banks' rate of growth. These observations suggest that the most reliable 
inference can be made on the basis of the first version ie. the specification (e) of 
Table 7. 
The counterfactual calculation suggest that the estimated moral hazard effect is 
quantitatively very important. Had the capital ratios been at the assumed safe level 
of 15 per cent for all banks, the rate of growth of lending by the two banking groups 
combined had been 16-21 percentage points ie. over one fifth less than it in fact was. 
Even more  striking  are  the results  for  the  two  banking  groups  separately. 
According to the version with the best overall fit, the absence of moral hazard had 
reduced the savings bank growth rate by almost a third from 98 per cent to 68 percent 
during the four year period considered. Also lending by the cooperative banks had 
been less without moral hazard incentives, but the difference is much less, only less 
than a thenth of the actual growth rate. If  the capital ratios for all banks had been at 
the maximum observed, 10 per cent, the reduction in moral hazard incentives had 
been less but still 15 percentage points for the savings banks. 
Finally, the difference between the two banking groups  stems mainly from 
different behaviour,  although to  some extent also the capital positions and cost 
positions of the savings banks were less favourable than those of the cooperative 
banks at the outset of the boom period. 
39 Table 1l.  Predictions for the aggregate growth of credit 
in 1986-1990, per cent 
The cooperative  The savings  The cooperative 
banks  banks  banks and 
savings banks 
together 
The total differential with the 
L  true ll- values  79  99  89 
D 
Prediction on the basis of 
specification (e) in Table (7) 
with the actual Kf  A ratios  79  98  88 
with KfA =  15%  73  68  70 
with KfA =  10%  76  83  79 
Prediction on the basis of LAD-
estimates of the same model 
with the actual Kf  A ratios  77  95  86 
with KfA =  15%  68  72  70 
with KfA =  10%  73  84  78 
Prediction of the basis of an 
equation imposing the same 
behaviour on the two banking 
groups 
with the actual KfA ratios  82  93  88 
with KfA =  15%  67  72  69 
with KfA =  10%  83  74  78 
40 6  Discussion 
The estimation results on credit extension. by the cooperative and savings banks 
support the hypothesis that low capital and high costs induced banks to expand 
lending in the boom years. The effect is particularly strong in the case of the savings 
banks. In the formal  model that underlies  the  empirical analysis,  the finding is 
consistent with moral hazard on the  part of bank equity holders.  The observed 
behaviour of banks' issuance of subordinated debt is broadly consistent with these 
conclusions. 
The part of credit growth in 1986 through 1990 that, according to the estimated 
models,  can be associated  with  moral  hazard  is  also  quantitatively  very  large. 
Counterfactual calculations suggest that almost a third of the lending growth of the 
savings banks as a group was due to moral hazard. For the cooperative banks the role 
of moral hazard seems quantitatively much smaller. In fact, in the absence of moral 
hazard, the lending by the savings banks had grown less than that of the cooperative 
banks. As there is a close association between lending growth and the magnitude of 
problem assets  (Solttila and Vihrial1i  1994),  eliminating moral hazard from  the 
savings bank behaviour would probably have changed the magnitude and nature of 
the Finnish banking crisis fundamentally.19 
The results suggest that banks did not on average change radically their lending 
strategies during the boom period; in fact the overall change can be better accounted 
for than changes over shorter subperiods. To the extext there was change over time, 
the results suggest that the prime impulses from weak capital and high costs to 
expansion of credit took place in the early part of the boom period, immediately after 
the main deregulatory measures in the financial markets. Furthermore, behaviour 
between the cooperative banks and the savings banks was more uniform in this period 
than later. On the other hand, demand impulses seemed to be largely absent early on. 
In the  second  half of the  boom period  (1989  and  1990),  when  restrictive 
monetary and regulatory policies had been introduced, the banks that had adopted an 
expansionary strategy in the early stage in response to weak capital and high costs, 
continued to expand lending rapidly. Relative to other banks their expansion in fact 
accelerated. In particular large savings banks continued rapid expansion of credit in 
this stage. So did the banks, in the running of which criminal activity was later 
suspected. Given the substantial upfront earnings associated with rapid growth, the 
profitability and  capital  asset ratios  of these expansionary banks had improved 
markedly by the  end of 1988.  Therefore,  for  a  while these banks did not look 
particularly weak in terms of profitability or capital. 
The observation that particularly those banks that had adopted the policy of  rapid 
expansion in the beginning of the boom period continued to expand (in relative 
terms) also in 1989 and 1990 is consistent with the idea that risk taking was to a large 
extent deliberate rather than based solely on overoptimistic expectations. So is the 
finding  about  the  role  of criminal  activity.  Thus  moral  hazard  rather  than 
misunderstanding of credit risks or bad luck is suggested. This conclusion is also 
19 In fact the effect of eliminating the "excessive" lending growth by the savings banks may be stronger 
than just limiting the later losses of the savings banks. The aggressive behaviour of the savings banks 
in the loan market probably induced also other banks to expand in a direct response to losses of market 
shares and also through the impact on asset values. 
41 supported by some internal documents of the two banking groups. In the Spring of 
1989 a circular sent from Skopbank to savings bank managers encouraged the banks 
to not to slow down credit growth in response to the special cash reserve requirement 
imposed by the Bank of  Finland, but to use the. opportunity to increase market shares 
(Kuustera  1995).  In contrast,  a  similar type  of circular  sent from  Okobank  to 
cooperative banks already in late 1988 suggested that the cooperative banks should 
slow down credit growth and tighten credit criteria. 
The findings of  this paper about moral hazard as a cause of  rapid growth of  bank 
lending are consistent with the results by Keeley (1990) and others who have found 
evidence of moral hazard.20 
However, our results differ in an important respect from most of the analyses 
finding support for moral hazard. The fundamental reason for moral hazard in these 
studies is underpriced deposit insurance.2!  This is not the case in this analysis. The 
theoretical model underlying the empirical analysis points to two reasons for moral 
hazard: underpricing of non-deposit funding and perverse enforcement of capital 
regulations or perhaps more appropriately bank support policies which reward risk 
taking. 
There is some evidence suggesting that the proximate cause of moral hazard is 
underpricing of non-deposit funding rather than an anticipation that a failure to meet 
the capital adequacy regulations would be rewarded by bank support with leanient 
terms. Namely, the introduction of tighter capital regulations in 1991 seems to have 
discouraged growth of lending. Such an impact is consistent with the underpricing 
of non-deposit funding but in conflict with the rewarding of capital insufficiency. 
Given the relatively weak statistical significance of the parameter in question, this 
evidence is  not very conclusive as  such. Nevertheless, against anticipated lenient 
bank support policies speaks also the fact that there was no experience of any such 
policy actions - proper or improper - after the second world war prior to the crisis 
of the 1990s. 
Why then had non-deposit funding been underpriced, and in particular so for the 
savings banks? In principle two types of explanations exist. First, the lenders to the 
banks did not understand the risks involved, either because the shocks which made 
bank portfolios to a large extent non-performing were wholy unpredictable or because 
the lenders simply were myopic. The shocks experienced by the Finnish economy 
very likely were to some extent unpredictable, and one cannot discount fully myopia 
20 Keeley examined 150 largest American bank holding companies in the period of 1970 through 1986. 
He found evidence that low underlying profitability or rather a low charter value of a bank as measured 
by the ratio of the market value to the book value of bank assets had a positive impact on risk taking 
by the banks. Risk taking was measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to the market value 
of assets and by the CD rates. Wheelock (1992) analyzed 257 Kansas banks of the 1920s. He found 
that the banks whose deposits were insured chose riskier portolios and failed with a higher probability 
than the uninsured banks. Park (1992) examined data on basically all the FDIC insured banks for the 
years 1984 through 1988. He found negative bivariate relationships between lending growth and other 
measures of risk taking on the one hand and capital asset ratios and earnings on assets on the other 
hand. 
21  Keeley's results do not necessarily require underpriced deposit insurance, but could equally well be 
due to implicit creditor protection, "too big to fail" policies. No distinction is made in his analysis 
between insured  and  uninsured institutions,  as  is  done by  Wheelock.  However,  KeeJey  himself 
interprets the results to reflect the particular problem of deposit insurance. 
42 either.22 However, it is very likely that a second factor ie. anticipation of creditor 
protection policies by the authorities played a role as well. For this speaks the same 
fact  which was  used to  argue  that risk taking by the expansionary banks  was 
deliberate: No change in the behaviour was observed even though the external 
conditions turned for worse in 1989. Second, the holders of non-deposit liabities are 
typically banks and other professional investors, who should know as much as there 
is to be known about bank risks. Third, particularly in the banking community there 
is a kind of folk theorem saying that rapid expansion is risky. Finally, the events 
during the banking crisis of course proved all potential expectations about public 
creditor protection policies correct: no creditor was allowed to incur losses. 
However, given the differences in behaviour between the savings bank group 
and the cooperative bank group it is useful to take a look at the types of non-deposit 
funding used by the individual savings and cooperative banks. As  discussed in 
section 3, the local banks had in principle two ways of finding non-deposit funding: 
directly from  the  market  for  example by issuing  large  denomination  CD's or 
indirectly via their respective "central banks", Okobank for the cooperative banks and 
Skopbank for the savings banks. Tables 2 and 3 reveal that relative to the total assets, 
the savings banks increased strongly borrowing from both sources in the boom period 
while the cooperative banks increased only borrowing from other banks (chiefly their 
central bank) and even that much less than the savings banks. On the assumption used 
in the underlying model that the banks indeed maximized the value of equity, these 
patterns suggest that pricing or availability of  funding was different between the two 
banking groups for both sources of refinancing. 
It seems in fact possible that the two central banks had different policies in the 
pricing of these funds. Although no numerical evidence is available, it has been often 
argued that Okobank charged a clear margin on the short-term financing of the 
cooperative banks on top of the CD rates.  Although these rates  may not have 
contained an explicit risk premium, funding of this type was subject to quantitative 
constraints even in the late 1980s, potentially resulting in steeply rising marginal cost 
schedules for individual cooperative banks, at least after some level of  indebtedness?3 
In contrast, according to Kuustera (1995), Skopbank provided the individual savings 
banks money market funding in unlimited amounts effectively at the going CD rates. 
Thus while the individual cooperative banks faced a relatively steeply rising marginal 
cost schedule of  their "central bank" financing, the savings banks may have been able 
to increase lending at an essentially constant posted marginal cost. A potential for 
moral hazard type of  behaviour for individual savings banks seems to exist. 
But if indeed Okobank followed a stricter policy with regard to financing the 
cooperative banks  than  Skopbank  in financing  the  savings  banks,  why  didn't 
cooperative banks substitute direct borrowing from the money market for borrowing 
from  Okobank?  One likely  explanation  is  the  very  small  average  size  of the 
cooperative banks; at the end of 1990 the average total assets of the cooperative 
banks were 310 millions while those of the savings banks were FIM 812 millions. 
Small banks have higher unit transaction costs and may be charged higher lemons 
22  For example Guttentag and Herring (1984) point out that "disaster myopia" may strongly limit 
economic agents' capacity to take precautions againts catastrofic low frequency events. 
23 The head of the finance department of Okobank, Mr. Jaakko Eloranta, confirmed this conjecture in 
a telephone interview in June 1995. 
43 premia than larger banks. But small bank size may not be the whole truth. In the 
regression analyses reported in this paper bank size is accounted for - and has a 
positive impact on lending, as expected - but the behaviour still differs significantly 
between the two banking groups. 
To fully account for these differences, one may need to resort to explanations 
that are outside the basic theoretical framework of this paper. More specifically, it 
may be that in  some  sense  the  legal  structure  and  business traditions  put less 
constraints  on  the  savings  bank  managers  who  potentially  seeked  to  exploit 
underpriced funding than on similar cooperative bank managers.24 
Whatever are the reasons for differences between the savings bank group and the 
cooperative banks group and the  differences between large and small banks, the 
question  remains,  how  could  Skopbank  and  some  large  savings  banks  and 
cooperative banks finance themselves in the money market without sufficient risk 
premium (or rationing)? We are thus back in the question about the role of implicit 
creditor protection policies.  As  long as  one is  unwilling to  accept  the  idea that 
investors in these banks' uninsured liabilities did not understand the risks involved, 
one is forced to conclude that the investors must have anticipated that their claims on 
the banks would be protected by the authorities. 
Probably in most countries the banks which have a pivotal role in the payments 
system and wholesale market are among the banks which can be perceived "too big 
to  fail".  In  the  Finnish  system  of the  late  1980s  such  core  banks  presumably 
comprised, from  the  point of view  of investors,  at least the 5 "helibor" banks, 
including Skopbank and Okobank. The helibor banks were the banks, whose CD's 
were used to calculate the indicative  money market rates, the helibors. 
Bank CD's were in the late 1980s in fact the main money market instrument. 
Given the low public sector indebtedness, there were not sufficient amounts of either 
short-term or long-term government paper in circulation for them to become the 
benchmark instruments in the money market. Instead bank CD's took this role. The 
predominant position of  bank CD's was strengthened by the fact that they became the 
instrument of the market operations of  the central bank, when such operations started 
in the early 1987. This role ofthe CD's very likely contributed to a uniform pricing 
of these instruments in the market, as the central bank treated all helibor banks' CD's 
in the same way and actually priced them at par with its own CD's when conducting 
market operations. As particularly Skopbank used CD funding very aggressively in 
the boom period,  pressures  emerged in  the  market place in  some  instances  to 
discount these papers relative to other CD's. However, price discrimination remained 
small, 20 basis points at the maximum, and was not applied by all major market 
24  There  are  in  fact  arguments  that  explain  "excessive"  risk  taking  by  management  interests. 
Particularly the line of argument put forward by Gorton and Rosen (1992) may have some relevance 
in explaining why large savings banks were inclined to expand lending in the adverse conditions of 
1989 and 1990. Their basic argument is that (low ability) managers that hold such a stake in a bank 
that their control by other shareholders is largely ineffective but whose ownership is not big enough 
to align their interests with those of the equity holders in general, are likely to take risky action under 
adverse economic conditions. Even though there are no true owners in the savings banks, excessive 
risk taking by the management may be constrained by other constituencies more effectively in small 
banks than in large banks. The representatives of depositors who according to savings bank legislation 
have the supreme powers may have a stronger influence in small banks. Similarly, the regulators may 
have greater prestige among the small banks. On the other hand, a full alignment of management and 
owner interests is unlikely in the savings banks of any size, as the managers cannot sell their "stake" 
in the bank as shareholder in ajoint stock company can. 
44 players. Not only the central bank continued to price Skopbank CD's at par with its 
own CD's but such uniform pricing was used also by some competing helibor banks. 
But quantitatively even more important than markka CD's was the funding 
Skopbank and some larger savings banks obtained from foreign banks and other 
foreign investors; at the end of 1990 Skopbank group alone had outstanding CD 
liabilities of the order ofFIM 13 billion (when peaking somewhat earlier about FIM 
20 billion), while the debts owed to foreign banks were FIM 29 billion and bond 
liabilities (excluding subordinated debt) FIM 15 billion. That also this funding, often 
times much longer in maturity than the CD funding in the markka market, was 
forthcoming at acceptable terms suggests that the crucial issue was a general trust that 
Finnish banks' debts would be very low risk rather than the role of bank CD's as a 
monetary policy instrument. 
Finally, there is the question why the central organizations of the two respective 
local banking groups behaved differently. In a sense this is an issue of economic 
history rather than economics. But disaster myopia may have played a role here too. 
Okobank experienced severe solvency problems in the early 1970s, as did later a 
relatively large cooperative bank, Iisalmen Osuuspankki. These experiences may have 
figured in the minds of the cooperative bank and Okobank managers in the late 
1980s, while similar acute crises had not been faced in the savings bank group. 
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47 Appendix 1 
The bank data 
The bank data are based on the income statement and balance sheet information 
published by the Statistics Finland for individual cooperative and savings banks 
(denoted by p in the list below). These public data are augmented with confidential 
information provided by the Statistics Finland on written authorizations by the banks 
concerned (denoted by c in the list). In addition, Financial Supervision has provided 
confidential data on capital adequacy (denoted by c). 
The basic data contains the following variables: 
Income statement 1985-1990 
1.  Interest earnings on credits granted to the public (p) 
2.  Other interest earnings (p) 
3.  Interest expenses on deposits by the public (p) 
4.  Other interest expenses (p) 
5.  Interest margin (p) 
6.  Other earnings (p) 
7.  Salaries and wages (p) 
8.  Other expenses (incl. credit losses since 1987) (p) 
Credit losses (c) 
9.  Operating margin (p) 
10.  Depreciation (incl. credit losses 1986)(p) 
11.  Business profit/loss (p) 
12.  Increase/decrease in reserves (p) 
13.  Direct taxes (p) 
14.  Net earnings/loss for the accounting year (p) 
Balance sheet 1985-1990 
1.  Cash (p) 
2.  Receivables from banks (p) 
3.  Overdrafts (p) 
4.  Bills os exchange (p) 
5.  Loans to the public (p) 
6.  Loans granted from state funds (p) 
7.  Adjustment items (p) 
8.  Bonds and debentures (p) 
9.  Shares and partnerships (p) 
10.  Machinery and equipment (p) 
11.  Other assets (p) 
12.  Equalization items (p) 
13.  Deposits by the public (excl. demand deposits) (p) 
14.  Demand deposits (p) 
48 15.  Claims of other banks (p) 
16.  Other liabilities (p) 
Subordinated debt (since 1987) (c) 
Other debt securities (since 1987) (c) 
Debentures (1985, 1986) (c) 
17.  Adjustment items (p) 
18.  Reserves (p) 
Reserves for bad debt losses (c) 
19.  Cooperative capital 1  primary capital (p) 
20.  Reserve fund and other funds (p) 
Reserve fund (c) 
Equalization fund (c) 
21.  Undistributed profit from previous years (p) 
22.  Net loss from previous years (p) 
23.  Net earning for the accounting year (p) 
24.  Net loss for the accounting year (p) 
Other data from Statistics Finland 1985-1990 
1.  Number of advances (p) 
2.  Number of deposit accounts (p) 
3.  Number of bills of exchange (p) 
4.  Number of employees (p) 
5.  Number of branch offices (incl. the head office) (p) 
The data from Financial Supervision (c) 
1.  Regulatory capital according to the Commercial Bank Act, Cooperative Bank 
Act and Savings Bank Act 1980-1989 
2.  Capital ratio according to the aforementioned acts 1980-1989 




4.  Assets and off-balance sheet commitments by risk category 31112/90 
100 per cent category 
50 per cent category 
20 per cent category 
o  per cent category 
49 Appendix 2 
The data on local market conditions 
The construction of the variables that are assumed to proxy local market conditions 
is dictated by the availability of data on municipal level. The main source is the 
municipal data base of  Statistics Finland (Kunta-avain). In addition, employment data 
have been obtained from the Ministry of Labour, and data on market shares from a 
Bank of Finland survey of the banks service network. The basic data consist of the 
following variables: 
(A) Statistics Finland: 
1.  population annually 
2.  urban population (taajamavaestO) in 1990 
3.  working age (15-65) population in 1990 





5.  taxable income in municipal taxation annually 
(B) Ministry of Finance 
6.  register-based unemployment rate, annual average 
(C) Bank of Finland 
7.  Loans extended by the branches of the major 5 banks in 1991 
To obtain observations that correspond to the operation area of a given bank, the 
basic data are added over the municipalities in which the bank has branches. In the 
case of the unemployment data, working age population is used as  a  weighting 
variable. Only population, taxable income and the unemployment rate variables are 
truly annual. The population structure variables are assumed to have been essentially 
constant over the period of interest. 
50 Appendix 3 
Capital regulation in the 1980s and the early 1990s 
The capital regulations in force throughout the  1980s and until the end of 1990 
required the cooperative banks and the savings banks to hold a minimum of 2 per 
cent of capital in relation to bank liabilities. The required ratio for the commercial 
banks which had a somewhat wider scope of authorized banking activities was 4 per 
cent. 
Towards capital were counted equity capital (commercial banks), cooperative 
capital (cooperative banks), primary capital (savings banks, reserve fund, equalization 
fund and other funds. The regulatory capital concept could also include half of the 
reserves for bad debt losses (up to 0.5 per cent of total liabilities), and subordinated 
debt (up to 50 per cent of the capital proper). 
The denominator in the regulatory capital ratio consisted of all liabilities on the 
balance sheet less subordinated debt and the equivalent of cash, reveivables from the 
state, municipalities, church, Bank of  Finland and other banks. Also the receivables 
guaranteed by the state, municipalities, church and certain bonds could be deducted. 
The savings banks and the cooperative banks could furthermore deduct up to 50 per 
cent of  the loans that were guaranteed by a public  ally supervised insurance company. 
On the other hand half of the off-balance sheet commitments were included in the 
bank liability concept. 
The  details  of the  regulations  were  set  by  instructions  of the  Banking 
Supervision. Thus, for example, the value adjustments of fixed property that could 
be used to add to the equalization fund were regulated by the Banking Supervision. 
In 1990 the banks were allowed to transfer 90 per cent of the reserves for bad 
loan losses to the reserve fund. This implied an increase in the regulatory capital as 
only half of the reserves could be counted towards capital. 
As of the beginning of 1991 a new Deposit Bank Act entered in force setting on 
all types of deposit banks a uniform requirement of 8 per cent of regulatory capital 
in relation to the risk-weighted  assets  and off-balance sheet commitments. The 
regulations  followed relatively closely the BIS  recommendations of the time.  A 
notable exception was that the assets of the savings banks and cooperative banks that 
were insured in a supervised insurance company continued to  have a preferred 
treatment: they were included in the 50 per cent risk category instead of the normal 
100 per cent. The regulatory reform implied tighter capital regulation for basically all 
banks, although the difference was  not as  much as  the pure percentages would 
suggest. The main lines of the prospective reform became known in the banking 
community at the latest in mid-1988. 
At the beginning of 1994 the Deposit Bank Act was replaced by the Credit 
Institution Act, which fully harmonized the Finnish capital regulations with the EC 
banking directives  thus  for  example abolishing  the  favourable  treatment of the 
insured assets. 
51 Appendix 4 
The exogeneity of deposits and deposit rates 
The exogeneity of deposit rates and deposit volumes are examined by regressing the 
deposit rate RD, the growth of deposits between 1986 and 1990 .1DID on the same 
explanatory variables  as  in  the basic model  for  the  loan deposit ratio  (with the 
exception of  RD, of course). For comparison, a similar equation is estimated also for 
the rate of growth of lending (.1LIL) between 1986 and 1990. 
The dependent deposit rate refers to the year 1988 in the reported equations. 
However, the results would not change qualitatively if any other year or the average 
over  the  whole  period  were  used.  The  bank  dependent  variables  are  dated 
alternatively at 1986 or 1988. The deposit growth rate is over the boom period as a 
whole. Again the results would not change qualitatively if shorter periods were used. 
None of the deposit rate or the deposit growth equations obtains a noteworthy 
R2. The explanatory variables - whether the characteristics of the banks or demand 
variables - are simply unable to account for the variation in the dependent variables. 
There is a clear difference in this regard vis-a-vis the equation for lending growth. 
In the rate equation the "other cost" variable obtains a significant negative 
coefficient. It is clearly inconsistent with the idea that costly banks would try to 
attract deposits with high deposit rates. If anything, it suggests that some costs have 
been incurred to be able to attract deposits with low rates of interest. 
The  deposit  growth  equation  perform  marginally  better  indicating  some 
dependence  of income  growth  and  the  share  of urban  population Given  these 
influences, also the size of the bank and whether the bank is a savings bank seems to 
be associated with deposit growth. As a whole the deposit equation does not suggest 
that treating deposits exogenous would be a bad approximation. 
Finally, the coefficients of the demand variables in the two growth rate equations 
suggest that lending growth is more elastic with respect to demand shift variables 
than deposit growth. 
52 Table A4.1  Equations for deposit rate and deposit growth, 
N=483 
DeEendent variable 
(l)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RD  RD  IlD/D  IlUL 
Eeriod  88  88  86-90  86-90 
Explanatory variables 
CONSTANT  .068  (5.5)***  .062  (8.47)***  0.61  (5.4)***  -.19  (-.88) 
KJA86  -.025  (-1.17)  -.68  (  -1.04)  -3.42  (-3.18)** 
KJA88  .027  (.60) 
C/A86  -.207  (  -2.96)***  -2.34  (-.68)  4.19  (.81) 
ClA88  -.18  (-2.22)** 
SIZE86  .00054  (1.65)*  -.024  (  -1.96)*  .06  (2.42)* 
SIZE88  .00033  (1.18) 
CP0  -.0045  (  -1.02)  -.0047  (-1.07)  -.006  (-.33)  .085  (2.46)** 
dINC  .012  (1.33)  .010  (1.14)  .0081  (1.98)**  .032  (2.95)*** 
dUNR  .002  (.20)  .005  (.38)  .073  (.16)  -.40  (-.46) 
CONSER  -.0088  (  -1.40)  -.0089  (-1.44)  .043  (.71)  .22  (1.28) 
URPOP  -.009  (-.78)  -.010  (-.80)  .16  (2.24)**  .41  (3.45)*** 
D:CONST  .006  (1.60)  .005  (1.55)  .052  (2.42)**  .10  (2.47)** 
X2(KJA, CIA)  .025  .025  .037  .00002 
R2  .006  .005  .06  .31 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. (a) the significance level. 
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